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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES	
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3	TC HEARTLAND LLC, :	
4	Petitioner : No. 16-341	
5	v. :	
6	KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC, :	
7	Respondent. :	
8	x	
9	Washington, D.C.	
10	Monday, March 27, 2017	
11		
12	The above-entitled matter came on for or	ral
13	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States	3
14	at 11:09 a.m.	
15	APPEARANCES:	
16	JAMES W. DABNEY, ESQ., New York, N.Y.; on behalf of	
17	the Petitioner.	
18	WILLIAM M. JAY, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of	
19	the Respondent.	
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:09 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument next in Case 16-341, TC Heartland v. Kraft
5	Foods.
6	Mr. Dabney.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES W. DABNEY
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. DABNEY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10	please the Court:
11	The Court in this case is presented with an
12	historic choice. That choice is between upholding or
13	destroying venue protections that Congress provided in
14	28 U.S.C. 1400(b), and that this Court interpreting that
15	statute declared to exist in its Fourco Glass decision.
16	And the correct choice, we submit, is to adhere to this
17	Court's existing, long-established interpretation of
18	Section 1400(b) and to reject the new call for a new
19	revisionist interpretation that would render Section
20	1400(b) nugatory in this case and in all but the most
21	unusual cases.
22	I'd like to open first with some undeniable
23	points. In Fourco Glass, this Court made two holdings
24	about 1400(b) that control this case. The first is this
25	Court interpreted Section 1400(b) as a standalone. It's

- 1 the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in
- 2 patent cases and is not to be supplemented with Section
- 3 1391.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How can that be when in
- 5 Brunette we said that 1391 governed aliens, the
- 6 definition of aliens? So that broad statement we
- 7 couldn't have meant.
- 8 MR. DABNEY: What the Court held in Brunette
- 9 was that venue legislation had, since the beginning of
- 10 the Republic, been extended only to United States
- 11 domestic persons and that the then-existing 1391(d) of
- 12 Title 28 was not a venue rule at all, but rather was a
- 13 codification of a principle that dated back to 1789 that
- 14 aliens were simply outside the scope of all venued laws.
- 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what do we do with
- 16 unincorporated associations?
- 17 MR. DABNEY: What we do
- 18 with unincorporated --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Those are -- those are
- 20 not defined by 1400.
- 21 MR. DABNEY: Well, 1400(b) in Fourco was
- 22 held to apply to all defendants. That was one ground on
- 23 which this Court held in Fourco that 1400(b) was
- 24 standalone, precisely because its predecessor had
- 25 applied to any person, corporation, or partnership. And

- 1 there was never any practical issue interpreting 1400(b)
- 2 as in litigation involving limited partnerships and even
- 3 unincorporated nonperson associations, because the
- 4 linchpin of 1400(b) and its predecessor was domicile.
- 5 When you have a venue rule that keys to
- 6 domicile and specifically distinguishes between a
- 7 domiciliary and a non-domiciliary, then the problems
- 8 that the Denver and Rio Grande case addressed and that
- 9 Respondent brings up as hypothetical problems simply
- 10 didn't exist.
- 11 It's noteworthy that in -- in the
- 12 Respondent's brief, they don't cite a single real world
- 13 example where there was any problem interpreting and
- 14 applying Section 1400(b) ever since the Sperry v.
- 15 American --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is there --
- 17 MR. DABNEY: -- Railroad case.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is there any other
- 19 provision, venue provision in which a venue for a
- 20 corporation is only the place of incorporation?
- MR. DABNEY: Where venue for a corporation
- 22 is only the place of incorporation. I cannot stand
- 23 here, Your Honor, and identify -- it could very well be
- that there is one, and that's a very good reason why
- when Congress amended 1391 in 2011, they put that broad

- 1 exception language in.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, don't you
- 3 suppose -- even for diversity purposes, a corporation
- 4 is -- is diverse based on not simply its place of
- 5 incorporation, but its principal place of business.
- 6 Principal place of business counts. It doesn't count
- 7 under 1400.
- 8 MR. DABNEY: Well, since 1948, that has been
- 9 the general rule that 1391(c) has provided. 1391(c) has
- 10 said for 60-odd years that a corporation, regardless of
- 11 its domicile, will be deemed to be resident in this
- 12 district, that district, that district. And that has
- 13 been a feature of general venue law since 1948. The
- 14 whole point here is that -- that rule was urged upon
- 15 this Court. In the Fourco Glass case, the Court
- 16 considered statutory language that was not materially
- 17 different in this respect from current 1391 and held
- 18 that 1400(b) when it says the judicial district where
- 19 the defendant resides, that means domicile. That means
- 20 where --
- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Again, whatever it said
- 22 in Fourco, it was not based on any statute. It was
- 23 based on the common law: Where is the corporation
- 24 domiciled?
- MR. DABNEY: Well, I would respectfully

- 1 disagree with that. The word "resides" in the statute
- 2 was a statutory term, and it had a very well-established
- 3 meaning at the time of the statute's enactment. And
- 4 this Court held one of the specific issues in this case
- 5 is, did the word "resides" in -- in 1400(b) signal a
- 6 change from the word "whereof he is an inhabitant" in
- 7 Section 48 of the 1911 judicial code. And this Court
- 8 held those words were synonymous. It meant domicile,
- 9 and there can only be one of those. There's only --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: What do --
- 11 MR. DABNEY: -- one domicile.
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: What do you think Congress
- 13 would have to do to reverse our decision in Fourco?
- MR. DABNEY: Well, there are many ways that
- 15 it could be done. And -- and in 2001, the American Law
- 16 Institute proposed that Section 1400(b) be repealed.
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is there any way Congress
- 18 could do it without repealing 1400?
- 19 Is there any change that Congress could make
- 20 to 1391 that would have that effect.
- 21 MR. DABNEY: I could imagine that if instead
- 22 of saying "except as otherwise provided by law," the
- 23 statute said "notwithstanding any other provision of
- law, this would govern." That would be a way to do
- 25 that. But --

- 1 JUSTICE KAGAN: That -- that would do it?
- 2 In other words, your argument in the end rests on that
- 3 "except" provision?
- 4 MR. DABNEY: It rests importantly on the
- 5 "except" provision. The "except" provision makes this
- 6 case an easier case than Fourco Glass was because at the
- 7 time of Fourco Glass, all you had was the general venue
- 8 statute and the very specific tailored, historic venue
- 9 statute that had been dating back to 1897. And so in
- 10 that case, the Court used the standard tools of
- 11 statutory construction and said, you know, the specific
- 12 statute is not going to be swallowed up and rendered
- 13 nugatory by the more general, and it applied the kind of
- 14 reasoning that the Radzanower case did. Radzanower v.
- 15 Touche Ross is a very, very analogous case to this.
- But now that Congress has specifically
- 17 provided not that 1391 overrides 1400(b), but that 1391
- 18 yields, is subordinate to other statutes and common law
- 19 that -- that provide otherwise for venue, that makes
- 20 this case just easy to apply.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: But -- but Congress also
- 22 said in 1391(c) that it was defining residency for all
- 23 venue places -- all venue purposes.
- MR. DABNEY: And the prior statute said for
- 25 venue purposes. So, yes, the word "all" was added.

- 1 Respondent has not identified any venue purpose that was
- 2 not covered by the original version of 1391(c) that now
- 3 is covered by 1391(c).
- 4 What we never had before 2011 was a statute
- 5 that subordinated 1391(c) to other venue provisions.
- 6 And we encourage the Court to read pages 31 and 32 of
- 7 Respondent's brief, because you don't get up until -- it
- 8 isn't until you get to page 31 that Respondent can even
- 9 bring itself to address the exception clause, which is
- 10 so clearly fatal to their position. They talk about all
- 11 means all means all for the first 30 pages.
- 12 And then finally we get to page 30 and 31, and what do
- 13 they say? Well, they say, well, the "except" language.
- 14 The "except" language has nothing to do -- this is on
- 15 page 32 -- the "except" language in Section 1391(a) has
- 16 nothing to do with the definition in 1391(c); quote,
- 17 "Those definitions do not govern venue," unquote.
- 18 Well, that directly contradicts what they
- 19 say on page 8 of their brief, which states, quote, "The
- 20 new -- Section 1391(c) now governs for all venue
- 21 purposes."
- 22 So the plain meaning of "govern" applies to
- 23 1391(c) by their own characterization. They're the ones
- 24 who are saying that 1391(c) governs venue in this case,
- 25 which is what they say on page 8, and then they try to

- do this acrobatic maneuver to escape the exceptions
- 2 clause by saying it doesn't govern. Well, as we say in
- 3 our reply brief, the plain meaning of "govern" means
- 4 that 1391(c) is part of the sections that in the
- 5 structure of 1391 is subordinated to the exception
- 6 language.
- 7 So the -- the Court doesn't need to do
- 8 anything here except say that Fourco's interpretation of
- 9 1400(b), which under Kimble v. Marvel and statutory
- 10 precedence of this Court, it is as much a part of that
- 11 statute as the words originally were, that that is part
- of the law that everyone agrees provides for a venue
- 13 otherwise than what the Respondent is arguing for.
- 14 The Respondent is arguing that 1400(b)
- 15 should now be given an artificial meaning imported from
- 16 1391(c). That is the exact argument that the Respondent
- 17 made in the Fourco case. The -- the Petitioner in
- 18 Fourco was a -- a West Virginia corporation who was
- 19 alleged to reside in the Southern District of New York
- 20 when it didn't actually reside, because the argument
- 21 was, it's deemed fictitiously to reside in New York
- 22 under 1391. And the Court said, in the context of
- 23 1400(b), which distinguishes between resident and
- 24 nonresident defendants, you can't import that synthetic,
- 25 fictitious definition of "resides" without destroying

- 1 both the text of the statute and completely defeating
- 2 its purpose.
- 3 1400(b) was enacted to restrict where patent
- 4 cases could be filed, and what we've seen in the Federal
- 5 search that's experiment since 1990 is a very good
- 6 demonstration of why patent cases need a venue statute
- 7 like 1400. If you don't have a venue statute like
- 8 Section 1400, you get the kind of litigation experiences
- 9 that are set out in the amici briefs.
- 10 The -- the law professor's brief noted that
- 11 there's a single judge in the United States that has
- 12 one-quarter of all patent cases in the United States on
- 13 his docket. This is a situation that cries out for
- 14 nothing more than upholding the venue protection that
- 15 Congress provided and that this Court announced in
- 16 Fourco, and that Congress took a very careful look at in
- 17 2011, and decided to --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Dabney, I mean, one
- 19 oddity of this case is -- is usually, when we say
- 20 something, when we issue a decision, we can be pretty
- 21 confident that Congress is acting against the backdrop
- 22 of that -- that decision. But I think that that would
- 23 be an odd thing to say in this case, given that for 30
- 24 years the Federal Circuit has been ignoring our decision
- 25 and the law has effectively been otherwise. And then

- 1 the question is, well, what is the backdrop against
- 2 which Congress is legislating.
- 3
  It seems actually that if -- if I were a
- 4 congressman, I'd think that the practical backdrop
- 5 against which I'm legislating is not Fourco; it is
- 6 instead the Federal Circuit's decision in VE Holding,
- 7 which is the decision that the practice has conformed
- 8 to.
- 9 MR. DABNEY: Well, I -- I can tell the Court
- 10 from someone who does practice that not everyone ever
- 11 acceded to VE Holding. And I think, if you look at what
- 12 actually happened in the 2011 act, it seems to me that,
- in 2011, Congress took steps that indicated that they
- 14 didn't get the memo, that this Court's decision in
- 15 Fourco Glass was a nullity and that -- and that its
- 16 disregard by lower courts had somehow become the law of
- 17 the land.
- 18 First, VE Holding, the 1990 decision of the
- 19 Federal Circuit, had seized upon a prepositional phrase
- 20 in a 1988 version under this chapter. So if Congress
- 21 was thinking, oh, what I want to do is lock in a
- 22 situation in which an enormous, extreme controversial
- 23 imbalance in Federal patent litigation that goes to a
- 24 very small number of victics, it was an odd thing for
- 25 Congress to have repealed the very grab-hold that --

- 1 that the Federal Circuit had seized on to justify its
- 2 results.
- 3 So I would argue that the legislation that
- 4 Congress passed, far from ratifying that holding, very
- 5 intentionally abrogated it. Not only that, in
- 6 September, three months before the 2011 act was passed,
- 7 Congress amended the America Invents Act to provide for
- 8 a new restriction on what could be deemed a regular and
- 9 established place of business under 1400(b). Section
- 10 18(c) of the AIA says that an automated teller machine,
- 11 an ATM, shall not be deemed a regular and established
- 12 place of business. Now, I suppose the Respondent would
- 13 say that that -- that provision was not inserted at the
- 14 behest of New York money center banks; that -- that
- 15 provision was put in at the behest of individuals who
- 16 didn't even form an LLC or a corporation so that they
- 17 would enjoy the protection alone.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, wasn't that statute
- 19 before the 1400 was enacted?
- MR. DABNEY: It was --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean that -- that case.
- MR. DABNEY: That -- that amendment was done
- 23 in September of 2011 by the same Congress, three months
- 24 before Congress declined to accept the American law --
- 25 JUSTICE BREYER: I don't quite see -- two

- 1 things; one, you can comment on it or not, but these
- 2 amici briefs, and -- they're filled with this thing
- 3 about a Texas district which they think has too many
- 4 cases. What's this got to do with this? As far as I
- 5 can see, if we're supposed to decide what's good or bad,
- 6 maybe you'd lose. But I -- I don't know whether that's
- 7 good, bad, or indifferent. Okay? But is there some
- 8 relevance to it?
- 9 And the second thing that I'd like to know
- 10 is you are not a corporation. So since you are not a
- 11 corporation, why do we have this case here deciding?
- 12 And what are we supposed to do about that? We don't
- 13 normally decide cases because Mr. Smith would like us to
- 14 decide a case involving a corporation. He's not a
- 15 corporation, nor are you. So what do we do?
- MR. DABNEY: Well, let me respond in -- in
- 17 two ways. First of all, from -- from the Petitioner's
- 18 point of view, the relevance of litigation behaviors in
- 19 the United States is important evidence of why
- 20 Section 1400(b) was a wise statute that Congress passed
- 21 and that it should be upheld. Not -- not --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, why, when you --
- 23 you're complaining about a -- a forum that's friendly to
- 24 infringers. If you've -- many corporations are
- 25 incorporated in Delaware. That's also said to be a

- 1 friendly forum.
- 2 MR. DABNEY: There -- there has never been,
- 3 in any other field of law, such a disparity between
- 4 patent infringement case filings and other case filings
- 5 in other areas of law. And -- and that --
- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: You can go into that if you
- 7 want. As far as that -- might be other people are
- 8 interested in that. But I really feel I need an answer
- 9 to my second question.
- 10 MR. DABNEY: Can you remind me what that --
- 11 JUSTICE BREYER: That is, you're asking us
- 12 to decide where venue is proper for a corporation, and
- 13 you are not a corporation. Therefore, on what basis are
- 14 we supposed to decide that?
- 15 MR. DABNEY: That -- that's not a correct
- 16 statement of our position. 1400(b) is not restricted to
- 17 corporate or individual or other defendants --
- 18 JUSTICE BREYER: Is there a holding that it
- 19 includes you?
- 20 MR. DABNEY: There's a holding in Fourco
- 21 that it applies to all defendants, all -- italicized
- 22 all. Justice Whitaker said all in italics.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Including a person.
- 24 MR. DABNEY: Including a person. Including
- 25 a partnership, including an unincorporated said

- 1 partnership. The -- the predecessor statute to -- to
- 2 1400(b) specifically said partnership.
- 3 So this was never a problem for patent
- 4 cases. It was always that all defendants, all types of
- 5 defendants were covered by the statute. So that has not
- 6 been a question that's ever been raised throughout this
- 7 case, and -- and the beauty of this is Judge Learned
- 8 Hand's opinion in the -- in the Sperry case, in 132
- 9 F.2d., it dealt with the hardest case of all.
- 10 TC Heartland is a chartered entity. It has
- 11 a charter, and you can tell where its principal place of
- 12 business is by just looking it up in a public record.
- 13 Learned Hand dealt with the hardest of all situations of
- 14 what do we do with an unincorporated association that
- 15 isn't an entity. The Association of American Railroads
- 16 that had no entity status at all, and Judge Learned Hand
- 17 in that case held -- which had been a rule applied
- 18 across the board in patent cases without problem -- that
- 19 for a nonperson, an association that was a nonperson, we
- 20 look to the -- the -- we -- we treat the inhabitants as
- 21 being where the principal place of business is located.
- But to -- to reiterate, the statute has
- 23 always applied to unincorporated entities, the patent
- 24 venue statute has, and the Respondent has not pointed to
- 25 a single real world --

- 1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, where does this
- 2 unincorporated entity reside?
- 3 MR. DABNEY: In Indianapolis, Indiana.
- 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No other place?
- 5 MR. DABNEY: No other place.
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What -- what do we look
- 7 to, to confirm that? What -- what --
- 8 MR. DABNEY: The corporate charter of the
- 9 company, it so happens to --
- 10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, no. What -- what law
- 11 do we look at to see where an LLC resides?
- MR. DABNEY: Under this Court's precedence,
- 13 the Court has looked to State law to determine where the
- 14 residence of a juristic person created by a State is
- 15 located, and so --
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Suppose the State would
- 17 say we count the principal place of business as well.
- 18 MR. DABNEY: It -- well, some states might
- 19 do that, but the States always require that the domicile
- 20 to be in the State.
- 21 So in this case -- in this case it's a very
- 22 straightforward case because the -- the -- the public
- 23 office, that is, its legal domicile under Indiana law,
- 24 is in Indianapolis. But -- but it is an Indiana -- it
- 25 is an Indiana domicile question under any -- under --

- 1 under anybody's interpretation.
- 2 So unless there is some fictitious meaning
- 3 given to 1400(b) imported from another place, this is an
- 4 easy case. There's -- there's -- the -- the Petitioner
- 5 has no offices in Delaware, it has no regular
- 6 established place of business in Delaware, and there's
- 7 really not much more to say about that.
- 8 There's -- there's one other point that I'd
- 9 like to bring up, and that is that 1400(b) was enacted
- 10 together with a Federal service of process statute found
- 11 today in 28 U.S. 6 -- U.S.C. 1694. And it authorizes
- 12 services of process in patent cases that are commenced
- 13 in a district where the defendant is not a resident, but
- 14 has a regular and established place of business. And
- 15 there is another demonstration that, in this context,
- 16 "resident" means domicile, and Federal law specifically
- 17 provides for nationwide service of process on
- 18 nonresident defendants.
- 19 So the key point I'd just like to leave you
- 20 with is, for more than 100 years, a patent venue has
- 21 been a function of the domicile of a defendant, and it
- 22 provides for an easy-to-administer, clear rule that
- 23 prescribes where venue is -- is permissive in a patent
- 24 case.
- 25 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but for more than 30

- 1 years the practice has been the other way. I mean,
- 2 I'm -- I'm -- I was thinking as I was reading the
- 3 briefs, sometimes we have accidental theme days at the
- 4 Supreme Court. So today's accidental theme is: When 30
- 5 years of practice goes against you, what happens?
- 6 (Laughter.)
- 7 MR. DABNEY: I -- I -- I heard Justice
- 8 Souter say something like that in the KSR case, you
- 9 know, the teaching-suggestion-motivation test has been
- 10 around so long that, at some point, the mistake becomes
- 11 the law. And -- and this Court has again and again and
- 12 again stood up for its authority to declare what the law
- 13 is.
- 14 On -- on issues of patent law, there's
- 15 actually a precedent, Andrews v. Hovey that says no
- 16 issue of patent law is settled until we have settled it.
- 17 In Dickenson v. Zurko, there's a tremendous
- 18 administrative law -- body of law that this Court said
- 19 the Federal Circuit was wrong in the way it --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, maybe the Federal
- 21 Circuit was wrong in not following Fourco, but the
- 22 question is now before us, and you are asking us to say
- 23 that venue in a patent infringement case is only where
- 24 the entity is incorporated or comparable to that, and
- 25 you have acknowledged that there is no other venue

- 1 provision for any other kind of claim that is so limited
- 2 to just the place of incorporation.
- MR. DABNEY: Well, I -- I would -- I would
- 4 respectfully disagree because what 1400(b) does is it
- 5 provides a different way to define venue for nonresident
- 6 defendants. 1400(b) isn't restricted just to the
- 7 district where the defendant is domiciled. 1400(b)
- 8 provides not the expansive regime that 1391(c) does, you
- 9 know, anyplace where, you know, someone could
- 10 constitutionally summon you into court. 1400(b) says
- 11 you have to have a regular and established place of
- 12 business and commit an act of infringement.
- Now, that's the choice that Congress made.
- 14 That is a different venue prescription than what 1391(c)
- 15 provides. And there is very good reasons. I could sit
- 16 here, and -- and as -- as someone who tries patent
- 17 cases, I could tell you, there's a reason why patent
- 18 litigation is -- has characteristics that make it much
- 19 more susceptible to the kind of forum shopping that some
- 20 of the amici have done because the injuries at issue in
- 21 patent litigations don't grow out of some tangible --
- 22 you know, a train wreck or some tangible loss where --
- 23 where it tends to bring the litigation to the place of
- 24 the injury.
- The injury claimed in patent litigation

- 1 usually is -- is a synthetic nonreceipt of a reasonable
- 2 royalty that allegedly is due, and -- and that can be
- 3 marketed and sold and transmitted into a forum. There's
- 4 all kinds of reasons why 1400(b) is an important law to
- 5 enforce and uphold.
- 6 If there are no further questions, I'd like
- 7 to reserve the rest of my time.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I do, actually.
- MR. DABNEY: Okay.
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Not so fast.
- 12 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE BREYER: Now, as long as you have a
- 14 minute, maybe you could indulge me and trace me through
- 15 this. With a corporation, I think 1400 says resides,
- 16 where the defendant resides.
- 17 MR. DABNEY: Correct.
- JUSTICE BREYER: But then that incorporated
- 19 Section 48. And Section 48 said where the defendant is
- 20 an inhabitant.
- MR. DABNEY: Correct.
- JUSTICE BREYER: And now "inhabitant," how
- 23 do we know that means where the incorporation is
- 24 incorporated or something? What does that mean in the
- 25 case of -- how do we know that that -- that that word

- 1 "inhabitant" means what you think it means?
- What do you think it means?
- 3 MR. DABNEY: Because Fourco said that.
- 4 Fourco said --
- 5 JUSTICE BREYER: And Fourco is going really
- 6 into whether 1391(c) or -- whether they made an
- 7 exception, whether they included that, and it says no.
- 8 It's a very short opinion.
- 9 MR. DABNEY: 1400(b) is the relevant part of
- 10 Fourco --
- 11 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah.
- 12 MR. DABNEY: -- is on page 226 --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah.
- MR. DABNEY: -- where the Court says, by an
- 15 eight-to-one vote, characterizing the change from
- 16 Section 48, in the middle of the page, quoting the
- 17 revisor's notes, words in subsection (b), "where the
- 18 defendant resides" were substituted for "of which the
- 19 defendant is an inhabitant" because the words
- 20 "inhabitant" and "resident" as respects venue, are
- 21 synonymous.
- 22 And then there's this parenthetical, "We
- 23 pause here to observe that this treatment, and the
- 24 express reason for it, seems to negative any intention
- 25 to make corporations suable in patent infringement cases

- 1 where they are merely doing business because" --
- 2 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah. It says in respect
- 3 of corporations, it means the state of incorporation
- 4 only.
- 5 MR. DABNEY: Correct.
- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: But you are not an
- 7 incorporation, so I'm back to my first question.
- 8 MR. DABNEY: The -- the treatment of
- 9 domiciles of -- of chartered entities has, under this
- 10 Court's precedence and under universal practice --
- 11 JUSTICE BREYER: And so I should look at
- 12 what case?
- 13 MR. DABNEY: We cite the Troutwine case as
- 14 a -- as an Indiana case --
- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Okay.
- MR. DABNEY: -- in our brief as an -- as an
- 17 example of that.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I thought you said it
- 19 depended on what -- that the State can define residence
- 20 in a different way.
- MR. DABNEY: Well, States will tell --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: With respect to LLCs.
- 23 MR. DABNEY: When a State creates a legal
- 24 person, a juristic, jural entity, the State will
- 25 prescribe where its -- its legal domicile is. And --

- 1 and that is a -- that is a matter of public record. So
- 2 it's an easy thing to find out.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 4 Mr. Jay.
- 5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM M. JAY
- ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
- 7 MR. JAY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 8 please the Court:
- 9 If I may, I'd like to offer a different
- 10 theme for today, and that would be definitions rather
- 11 than the 30-year point that Justice Kagan posited.
- 12 Congress has written a definition of
- 13 "residence" that applies for all venue purposes.
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but I mean --
- 15 yes, there's a difference between for venue purposes,
- 16 and for all venue purposes, and for venue under this
- 17 chapter, but this is something fairly significant in the
- 18 area of patent law. And I would have thought that if
- 19 Congress were trying to make a significant change,
- 20 there'd be a lot more evidence of it other than just
- 21 changing the particular nuances of -- of the words.
- MR. JAY: Well, of course, Mr. Chief
- 23 Justice, it isn't here a change from "for venue
- 24 purposes" just to "for all venue purposes." There are,
- 25 I think, four changes in between the Fourco text and the

- 1 text today. And in between, you had the statute
- 2 construed in VE Holdings which said "for purposes of
- 3 venue under this chapter."
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But there's no real
- 5 evidence of any -- including in the nuances you talk
- 6 about -- of such a significant change.
- I mean, the -- we can't get -- we can't get
- 8 rid of this issue. I mean, we tried in -- in Stonite
- 9 and then in Fourco. It just sort of keeps coming up.
- 10 And -- and I would have thought, when you have -- well,
- 11 I mean, is our Fourco decision law?
- 12 MR. JAY: Fourco -- the principles by which
- 13 Fourco interpret the statutes are still good law --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, then the --
- 15 MR. JAY: -- but the definition that Fourco
- 16 applied is no longer the controlling definition of
- 17 "residence."
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay. Well, the
- 19 current statute says "except as otherwise provided by
- 20 law." And I would have thought that excluded
- 21 overturning the Fourco decision.
- MR. JAY: So, I don't think so, Your Honor.
- 23 And I think that the function that "except as otherwise
- 24 provided by law," I'd like to illustrate what work that
- 25 is doing in the statute, and then I would like to

- 1 explain why nothing, in fact, "otherwise provides by
- 2 law" in 1400(b).
- 3 So if you look at the appendix to the red
- 4 brief, pages 3A to 4A, and then again 5A to 6A, these
- 5 are the old statutes. So this is the '88 version and
- 6 then it would actually be the '52 version. And, you
- 7 know, from the '48 recodification.
- 8 "Except as otherwise provided by law" has
- 9 been in the statute since the '48 recodification. Where
- 10 was it? It was in the general venue provision, and it
- 11 was in the diversity venue provision, (a) and (b) of
- 12 1391. So that's right in the carryover on --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is that the end, and then
- 14 later it's going to be -- it's going to be moved to the
- 15 beginning.
- 16 MR. JAY: That's right. So now that there
- 17 is -- there aren't separate statutes anymore for general
- 18 venue, diversity venue, and local action venue, which
- 19 was 1392, all of that's now in 1391(b). And this
- 20 "except as otherwise provided by law" language, which
- 21 has always been there, has now been put in 1391(a). And
- 22 if you look at why the American Law Institute drafted it
- 23 just that way, because it's just the way that the ALI
- 24 drafted it that Congress adopted, you will see that --
- 25 both from the ALI report and also from page 18 of the

- 1 House report, that the purposes of this "except as
- 2 otherwise provided by law language" is to, quote,
- 3 "follow current law." It wasn't intending to overrule
- 4 VE Holding at all.
- Now, my friend on the other side --
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No -- but it wasn't
- 7 intended to overrule VE Holding, but I suspect it wasn't
- 8 intended to overrule Fourco at all either. And Fourco
- 9 is a decision of this Court.
- 10 MR. JAY: It certainly is, Your Honor. But
- 11 I do think that Fourco is based on two things, and I --
- 12 those things are no longer the case in the statute. Let
- 13 me walk through that.
- 14 So Fourco is based on two things. Number
- one, the fact that 1400 was recodified in the 1948
- 16 revision of the Judicial Code. And if there isn't a
- 17 change specified in the revisor's notes, the Court said
- 18 it will not read that change in, even though,
- 19 ordinarily, when Congress makes a change in language,
- 20 this Court's presumption is the opposite. The Court's
- 21 presumption is that Congress means to do something by
- 22 its change, not in the recodification context. Now we
- don't have the recodification context anymore.
- 24 The other thing is the specific and the
- 25 general canon. This Court said that 1391(c), as it then

- 1 existed, was clearly a general corporation venue
- 2 statute, and so it was. It provided where a corporation
- 3 could be sued. It doesn't do that anymore. 1391(c) is
- 4 now a purely definitional provision, and it was adopted
- 5 specifically to clear up a number of the nagging
- 6 problems that the members of the Court have been asking
- 7 my friend about, including where do you sue an
- 8 artificial entity that is not a corporation? Where does
- 9 it reside.
- Justice Breyer, the answer to your question
- 11 is in this -- this Court's decision in Denver and Rio
- 12 Grande from 1967. Now, my friend says, well, that's a
- 13 general venue case. But I think the salient point is
- 14 that the Court said in that case, there is -- there was
- 15 no settled construction of the law on where an
- 16 unincorporated association resides in 1948, and there is
- 17 none yet.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Did you raise the
- 19 significance of the fact that it was an unincorporated
- 20 association in your brief in opposition?
- MR. JAY: No, Your Honor, because we don't
- 22 think that it matters because the definition now applies
- 23 to all business entities; corporations, and LLCs.
- 24 The --
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It seems odd to me

- 1 you didn't raise it in your brief in opposition, and yet
- 2 it takes up several pages in -- in your brief on the
- 3 merits.
- 4 MR. JAY: Because it's relevant to our
- 5 statutory interpretation, that our interpretation, but
- 6 not the other side's, would clear up this issue and save
- 7 the Court from having to confront in another case where
- 8 does an LLC reside.
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: Why another case?
- 10 MR. JAY: -- in another case --
- 11 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, look -- look.
- 12 You -- if you -- if you're right, you win. That's the
- 13 end of the case. If you're wrong, then you have another
- 14 point, and that is that Fourco doesn't apply really to
- 15 unincorporated associations. So why isn't the right
- 16 thing to do for us to decide the issue, if you win,
- 17 that's the end of it; and if you lose, you send it back
- 18 and we say to the lower court, if you haven't forfeited
- 19 the point, maybe you could raise it and arque it.
- Is that the correct way to handle this?
- MR. JAY: I think that that's fine, Your
- 22 Honor. I do think that --
- 23 JUSTICE BREYER: That's fine. That's the
- 24 correct way to handle it?
- MR. JAY: Yes, simply because -- because we

- 1 think, of course, that we win. And one reason that we
- 2 win --
- 3 JUSTICE BREYER: Obviously, you think you
- 4 win. And -- and.
- 5 MR. JAY: Yes.
- JUSTICE BREYER: -- and --
- 7 (Laughter.)
- 8 JUSTICE BREYER: Look. I -- I'm -- I'm not
- 9 worried about it if you win. What I'm worried about
- 10 what to do is if you lose.
- MR. JAY: Right. And so I agree with what
- 12 Your Honor just said. But I -- but the -- the question
- 13 about what to do with LLCs and what to do with
- 14 defendants who don't reside in the United States -- this
- 15 goes to Justice Sotomayor's question -- is a big part of
- 16 why -- why the ALI working with the Judicial Conferences
- 17 Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction proposed a
- 18 statute that would resolve these ambiguities in the
- 19 naked word "resides" or "resident" --
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: But I thought the ALI -- and
- 21 you -- you rely upon it in your briefs a lot and you
- 22 rely on it here. I mean, the ALI wanted to get rid of
- 23 1400, and Congress didn't do that.
- MR. JAY: That's right. But its -- its
- 25 proposal to clear up the ambiguities in the word

- 1 "resident" or "resides" for all venue purposes, the ALI
- 2 explained in its report at page 188 and 189, and then
- 3 Congress then, in the House Report at page 20, echoed it
- 4 almost exactly. The reason to -- the work that is --
- 5 the work that the words "for all venue purposes" do is
- 6 to provide that these definitions shall apply not just
- 7 to the general venue statute, but to all venue statutes,
- 8 general or special. And the House Report says the same
- 9 thing on page 20, even though, of course, as you said,
- 10 the House didn't repeal 1400. And we're not saying that
- 11 14 --
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: In -- special or there are
- 13 lots of different ones. But did it say, if you pass
- 14 this, don't worry about getting rid of 1400, because
- 15 this gets rid of it? I mean, did they say anything like
- 16 that at all?
- 17 MR. JAY: No. Because 1400 still serves a
- 18 function.
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I mean, getting rid
- 20 of Fourco.
- MR. JAY: Oh. Well, that's a different --
- 22 that's a different --
- 23 JUSTICE BREYER: Did it say anything --
- MR. JAY: Well, but -- but -- but
- JUSTICE BREYER: I mean -- when I used to --

- 1 maybe this was years ago. This said, don't worry about
- 2 repealing 1400. If you pass this, you will be rid of
- 3 the Supreme Court's interpretation in Fourco. Or
- 4 anything like that.
- 5 MR. JAY: What it said, Your Honor, is that
- 6 the Federal Circuit's decision in VE Holding was it
- 7 called it a partial palliative. It said that the work
- 8 needed to be finished, because VE Holding addressed
- 9 corporations based on the statute as it -- corporate
- 10 defendants, based on the statute as it then was, but
- 11 that the work needed to be carried forward in the
- 12 definition for, number one, corporate plaintiffs, where
- 13 do they reside; and, number two, unincorporated
- 14 defendants, where do they reside? And that's what this
- 15 cross-cutting, all-purpose definition was intended to
- 16 do.
- 17 But for the -- I think it's important to
- 18 note that under our view, 1400(b) does do work. It is
- 19 the venue statute. So you have to show either that the
- 20 defendant reside -- all defendants reside there, or all
- 21 defendants are subject to suit there under the other --
- 22 under the second half. That's different from what the
- 23 general venue statute provides, which, for example, can
- 24 base venue on the residence of only one defendant.
- 25 There is significance; there is work left to be done for

- 1 1400(b). But it doesn't define --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: And -- and -- because I
- 3 thought that the only thing that left was to govern a
- 4 suit against an individual.
- 5 MR. JAY: Well, a suit against an individual
- 6 would still -- would be more likely to trigger the
- 7 second half of the statute. But in deciding what is the
- 8 proper venue, the first thing you do is you look at
- 9 which is the right venue statute? In this case, it's
- 10 not the general venue statute 1391(b); it is the special
- 11 venue statute for patent cases, 1400(b). Now, that
- 12 doesn't define "resides." "Resides" is defined to "all
- 13 venue purposes" somewhere else. It's in 1391(c). And
- 14 so for "all venue purposes," that's the definition you
- 15 apply. Now, when the defendant is --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, Mr. Jay.
- 17 (B) gets really subsumed by (a) -- 1400(b),
- 18 the second part of it, gets subsumed by 1391. There's
- 19 no -- you keep saying there's work for this, but I --
- 20 where?
- 21 MR. JAY: So the second half, I agree, does
- 22 not have much work left to do, except in cases where the
- 23 defendant's an individual. So I think that that -- that
- 24 by itself means that the second half is not surplusage.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, but --

1 MR. JAY: But let me answer that --2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you would have specific jurisdiction if the person committed an act of 3 4 infringement and has regular established place of business. Presumably, they're doing business in that 5 6 State by doing the act of infringement. 7 MR. JAY: But the -- for an individual defendant, Justice Sotomayor, the definition isn't based 8 on personal jurisdiction. It's based on their domicile. 9 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Tell me what patent case we've ever had an individual sued that wasn't an agent 11 12 of a company. 13 MR. JAY: I can't cite one right now. I --14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I couldn't find one. 15 MR. JAY: Well, but I can tell you, for 16 example, that, you know, my friend Mr. Dabney says that 17 this -- the problems we've raised are hypothetical problems. This Court has six patent cases this term. 18 Four of them have LLC defendants in them. And we think 19 20 that understanding where an LLC resides is actually a very important point. LLCs were basically a business 21 22 entity that came into existence in about 1979 and really 23 have only taken off in the last 20 years. Applying the 24 1897 definition of "inhabitant" carried forward into

1400(b) without this definition doesn't give you that

25

- 1 answer. And we know that because --
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought -- I
- 3 thought you responded to Justice Breyer by saying that
- 4 is an issue that could be dealt with on remand --
- 5 MR. JAY: No, Your Honor. What --
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- the difficulty of
- 7 determining where an LLC is located.
- 8 MR. JAY: No, Your Honor. What I said both
- 9 to Your Honor and to Justice Breyer is that it informs
- 10 our statutory answer. In other words, this difficulty
- is the reason why you should adopt our reading of the
- 12 statute and not the other side's. As for if you adopt
- 13 the other side's --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's a difficulty --
- 15 again, it's a difficulty you didn't point out to us at
- 16 the jurisdictional stage.
- 17 MR. JAY: I think there are -- the reasons
- 18 to adopt our statutory interpretation are many: The
- 19 text, the legislative history, and the structural
- 20 considerations. And I think that they are all fair game
- 21 here on the merits. We're not -- we're not urging you
- 22 to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, but I
- 23 think that the practical difficulties with the other
- 24 side's statutory interpretation, we're not required to
- 25 raise all of those in a brief in opposition in order for

- 1 you to consider why you should adopt our reading on the
- 2 merits.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Jay, can I just ask
- 4 you -- and this is a clarification question, and maybe I
- 5 should know this. But you have the original 1391, which
- 6 was the subject of Fourco.
- 7 MR. JAY: Uh-huh.
- 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: Then you have the 1988
- 9 amendment. Then you have the 2011 amendment?
- 10 MR. JAY: Correct.
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is it the 2011 amendment
- 12 that you think changed things, or is it also the 1988
- 13 amendment? And if it's the 2011 amendment, exactly
- 14 which words do you think changed the thing?
- 15 MR. JAY: So it's both, Your Honor. I don't
- 16 think you need to agree with me about the '88 amendment,
- 17 but we do think that for corporate defendants, it
- 18 changed in 1988. It did not change for noncorporate
- 19 defendants in 1988, because those weren't the words that
- 20 Congress used.
- 21 In 2011, we think that there are four
- 22 things -- and I think these are the four differences
- 23 that I wanted to talk about with respect to Fourco. We
- think that "for all venue purposes" does the work
- 25 because that's what the ALI and the House Report told

- 1 you in addition to their plain and unambiguous meaning.
- 2 We think that the definition --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: So why is "for all purposes"
- 4 different from "for venue purposes" or "for purposes of
- 5 venue" under this chapter? Why isn't it all the same?
- 6 MR. JAY: Well, "for all venue purposes" is
- 7 broader consciously than "for purposes of venue" under
- 8 this chapter because there are more than 200 venue
- 9 statutes that are outside Chapter 87. And Congress and
- 10 the ALI wanted to --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, but 1400 was within the
- 12 chapter --
- MR. JAY: That's right.
- 14 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- so the effect was exactly
- 15 the same, wasn't it?
- 16 MR. JAY: It wasn't because now it's no
- 17 longer just corporate defendants. The 2011 amendment
- 18 adds to the definition. It provides for a domicile for
- 19 individual defendants. It expands the (c)(2) definition
- 20 to cover other business entities besides corporations,
- 21 which wasn't done in the '88 amendment, and it provides
- 22 a rule that slightly tweaks what this Court said in
- 23 Brunette. It provides what the rule should be for
- 24 defendants who do not reside in the United States.
- Now, my friends on the other side say,

- 1 essentially, aliens can be sued in any district. And
- 2 that's what the prior statute said. But that's not what
- 3 Congress wanted the law to be anymore. Congress wanted
- 4 the law to be that a defendant that does not reside in
- 5 the United States may be sued in any district.
- 6 How do you decide if a defendant resides in
- 7 the United States? You apply (c) (1) and (c) (2). All
- 8 those definitions tie together. And I think that if --
- 9 if Congress had wanted to dispense with -- dispense with
- 10 Brunette for patent cases and creates, you know, an
- 11 entirely different rule just for patent cases, I think
- 12 there, it would have said so. But instead, it wanted to
- 13 adopt a cross-cutting definition.
- 14 Third point: The definition of venue in
- 15 1390. We -- if there's any doubt about what a venue
- 16 purpose is, you can look at the definition of the word
- 17 "venue." And some statutes that might be considered
- 18 venue statutes are excluded from that definition.
- 19 They're the ones that regulate the subject matter
- 20 jurisdiction of a court and say that, this court and
- 21 only this court -- you know, let's say the district
- 22 court for D.C. -- shall have jurisdiction to decide .
- 23 That's carved out of venue, but the patent venue statute
- 24 certainly is not carved out of venue.
- JUSTICE BREYER: You asked me this

- 1 question -- answer this. I -- I'm not an expert in this
- 2 area, comparatively speaking, so you need -- I need
- 3 enlightenment here.
- 4 Think of A-1. This section shall govern the
- 5 venue of all civil actions brought in district courts.
- 6 Okay. So what's an example of one that it doesn't
- 7 govern, where the law provides otherwise?
- 8 MR. JAY: A special venue statute that
- 9 provides that, instead of the -- so if you -- if you
- 10 turn the page to 2A, the -- here is the general venue
- 11 statute, venue in general. So a special venue statute
- 12 that provides that the basis for venue should be, for
- 13 example, the plaintiff's residence instead of the
- 14 defendant's residence, that is an example of a special
- 15 venue statute --
- 16 JUSTICE BREYER: So in other words --
- 17 MR. JAY: -- by law.
- JUSTICE BREYER: B doesn't apply because of
- 19 the words in A, except as otherwise provided by law.
- MR. JAY: That is exactly --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.
- MR. JAY: Why Congress put those words
- 23 into --
- JUSTICE BREYER: A.
- 25 MR. JAY: -- general venue statutes in 1948

- 1 --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah.
- MR. JAY: -- and why they are still there
- 4 today.
- 5 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So why, if it
- 6 governs B, does it not govern C? The words except as
- 7 otherwise provided by law you've just said, and I think
- 8 you are absolutely right as far as I understand it.
- 9 That those words govern B. They govern A and they govern
- 10 B, then why don't they govern C?
- 11 MR. JAY: So their function is to prevent B
- 12 from swamping a special venue --
- JUSTICE BREYER: That might be--
- MR. JAY: But so --
- JUSTICE BREYER: So -- so -- I know, but B
- 16 is in a separate section.
- MR. JAY: Yes.
- 18 JUSTICE BREYER: And now C is the next
- 19 section, so why doesn't it govern that?
- 20 MR. JAY: So, two reasons. Number 1 -- I
- 21 think the reason that uses the word section is that
- 22 previously there were two general venue sections. Some
- 23 were in 1391 and there were more for local actions in
- 24 1392.
- One of the things that Congress did in 2011

- 1 was get rid of 1392, so that's why I think it wrote in
- 2 this section shall govern the venue. Now, what does it
- 3 mean to govern venue? What it means to govern venue is
- 4 to provide, on which, bases venue shall lie.
- 5 Plaintiff's residence, defendant's residence,
- 6 personal -- principal place of business? There are
- 7 venue statutes that do each of those things.
- 8 1400(b) it is a special venue statute, and
- 9 it says defendant's residence or the conjunctive
- 10 definition in the second half. So, this is what
- 11 provides -- this is what says look to 1400(b) and not to
- 12 the general venue statute in a patent infringement case.
- Of course, in a -- in another patent case,
- 14 where it's the alleged infringer bringing a declaratory
- 15 judgment action, saying that I want a declaration I
- 16 don't infringe, that does go under the general venue
- 17 provision and there are lots of declaratory judgment
- 18 actions brought right now by the prospective defendants
- 19 that get to use the general venue provision. They get
- 20 to sue patent owners anywhere the patent owner is
- 21 subject to personal jurisdiction.
- 22 And one virtue of our rule is that it
- 23 creates greater harmony between the sort of declaratory
- 24 judgment actions which are kind of -- where the
- 25 defendant races into the courthouse to sue first, and an

- 1 infringement action brought by the patent owner under
- 2 1400(b).
- So I -- I hope that I've -- that I've
- 4 answered your question about why this doesn't govern --
- 5 why this doesn't do the work. But another part of that
- 6 answer, which I had promised to get back to the Chief
- 7 Justice on, is -- is about why nothing provides
- 8 otherwise by law in this case, even if you don't agree
- 9 with anything that I've said to this point, and that is
- 10 because Fourco interpreted the word residence in 1400(b)
- 11 and that's absolutely true. 14 -- it gave it the same
- meaning that it had in all the venue statutes in 1897.
- 13 Diversity venue, general venue, patent venue. It just
- 14 meant inhabitant, and inhabitant had -- it did have a
- 15 meaning to corporations. It did have a meaning for
- 16 individuals. It didn't have a settled meaning to
- 17 unincorporated associations, but we can -- we can come
- 18 back to that.
- The point is that Congress has now
- 20 adopted -- and one thing that my friend said that I --
- 21 that I entirely agree with. It is an artificial
- 22 definition. It is an artifical definition of residence,
- 23 but it did so because it wanted to eliminate nice
- 24 distinctions about where in -- particular kinds of
- 25 business entities reside using the term as it was used

- in 1897, and it wanted to simplify the inquiry.
- 2 You are going to have to answer the personal
- 3 jurisdiction question in all of these cases anyway. So
- 4 for corporate defendants, giving an additional venue
- 5 inquiry about whether they -- where they are doing
- 6 business or where they have a regular and established
- 7 place of business are additional complications layered
- 8 on top of that personal jurisdiction inquiry that you
- 9 are going to have to do anyway.
- 10 That's why Congress, in 1988, for general
- 11 venue, decided to make personal jurisdiction the
- 12 touchstone for venue as well for corporate defendants,
- 13 and why the ALI, working with the judicial conferences
- 14 committee, and then Congress, decided to expand that to
- 15 unincorporated associations for all venue purposes in
- 16 2011. It's simpler, it's crosscutting, it's not sort of
- 17 a patent specific rule, but it is the best rule and it's
- 18 the rule that Congress adopted. And --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So a lot of amici
- 20 discussions as to their reasons for why so many suits
- 21 are centered in this court in Texas, what is your
- 22 reason, why do you think that is true?
- MR. JAY: So I think that -- if I understand
- 24 your question is, why do people sue -- what are people
- 25 suing in this court in Texas or why are so many

- 1 people suing in this court in Texas.
- 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is it 1391 or is it
- 3 something else?
- 4 MR. JAY: Well, it's only 1391 in the sense
- 5 that it -- it's a permissible choice, but I don't think
- 6 that -- that is an answer to the question of why they
- 7 choose that over all other permissible choices.
- 8 And I think if there are complaints about
- 9 the way things are handled in East Texas, and my client,
- 10 Kraft, has been a defendant in East Texas in patent
- 11 infringement cases as well. If there are complaints
- 12 they tend to be complaints that aren't venue style
- 13 complaints. In other words, it's an inconvenient forum
- 14 compared to where I am located. They tend to be
- 15 complaints about how the cases are managed, how
- 16 discovery takes place, how motions practice is handled,
- 17 and so on. And those complaints, if they are valid,
- 18 would be valid even when venue is indisputably proper
- 19 over a Texas defendant. They are problems that should
- 20 be dealt with on their own terms rather than by letting
- 21 anybody not from Texas out of that district and leaving
- 22 everyone else still in the district with -- where the
- 23 practice is unchanged.
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I -- I didn't
- 25 understand that answer. You are saying the problems

- 1 would be there for Texas corporations that actually
- 2 reside in that district anyway. So we shouldn't worry
- 3 that 25 percent of the nationwide cases are there?
- 4 MR. JAY: I'm saying two things, Your Honor.
- 5 Number one, I think the complaints about East Texas
- 6 aren't really about overcrowding -- and I would like to
- 7 answer that as my second point. But that -- rather they
- 8 are about the way that the cases are handled, you know,
- 9 whether there be, you know, one case or a thousand
- 10 cases.
- 11 Or -- and we talk about the overcrowding --
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: But the complaint is that it
- 13 allows a kind of forum shopping, right? That it --
- 14 you -- let's go down to Texas where we can get the
- 15 benefit of a certain set of rules.
- 16 MR. JAY: I mean, I think that the same
- 17 criticism can be made of the rule that Congress adopted
- 18 for the general venue statute in 1988, or for that
- 19 matter, the fairly liberal rule that Congress adopted
- 20 for corporation in 1948, and patent cases, number one,
- 21 don't have the varying circuit law. They have a single
- 22 Federal court, appeals court; and number two, they don't
- 23 have choice of law problems, you know, so that you can
- 24 certainly have forum shopping problems under the general
- 25 venue provision quite easily as well. I do think --

- 1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The general -- generous
- 2 jury verdicts enter into this or is that something we
- 3 shouldn't think about?
- 4 MR. JAY: So I -- I think that the empirics
- 5 -- you know, there is a battle in the amicus briefs
- 6 about that. I mean, I think that at least one scholar
- 7 has said that the outcomes are not significantly
- 8 different in cases that go to trial. We don't have a
- 9 position on that. We haven't crunched -- crunched the
- 10 numbers ourselves. But ultimately we think that --
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But certainly that might
- 12 be a perception by the -- by the bar who
- 13 brings -- by the -- those in the bar who bring these
- 14 suits.
- MR. JAY: It -- it might well be and I --
- 16 and it -- certainly that is -- that is the argument that
- 17 is being made to Congress, and I think that when
- 18 Congress is -- you know, takes up this issue as it has
- 19 already been asked to do and it's already been
- 20 considering at the committee level. Congress can do
- 21 something that this Court doesn't have the ability to do
- 22 in this case, and that is to modulate venue in the -- in
- 23 a way that is not binary. I mean, in this case you --
- 24 you only have two choices.
- 25 My friends on the other side say, reside for

- 1 a corporate defendant just means the state of
- 2 incorporation, that is it. What Congress can do is
- 3 create a definition that doesn't turn on the word
- 4 resides at all, I -- or that adds more choices that
- 5 could add principal place of business. It can add where
- 6 the plaintiff has done research on the invention that is
- 7 patented. Those are, in fact, what the proposals look
- 8 like. None of the legislative proposals about patent
- 9 venue in the last 10 years that I've seen look anything
- 10 like what the -- what my friend on the other side are
- 11 proposing.
- 12 Nobody likes the one place of residence
- 13 rule. They all at least offer principal place of
- 14 business and some plaintiff-centered venue, and that is
- 15 why the empirics say that if you adopt the rule that my
- 16 friends on the other side are proposing, you will shift
- 17 more than half of all cases from the district where they
- 18 now are into other districts. Whereas, if Congress
- 19 adopted its current -- the current version of its
- 20 reform, nonpracticing entity cases would largely move,
- 21 but operating company cases largely would not. Whereas,
- 22 if you adopted Heartland's rule, operating company cases
- 23 would wind up shifting, and this gets back to my point,
- 24 Mr. Chief Justice, they would have to shift to places
- 25 like Delaware where lots of defendants are incorporated,

- 1 and if everybody were incorporated in Delaware maybe
- 2 that would be okay, but because lots are incorporated in
- 3 Delaware and some are not, you have kind of a dual
- 4 problem.
- 5 You're going to have overcrowding in
- 6 Delaware and you're -- you're -- the cases that really
- 7 out to be in the same place, you won't be able to bring
- 8 in the same place.
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Were any -- were any
- 10 of these policy considerations addressed by Congress
- 11 when it made the change you suggest it made in 2011?
- 12 MR. JAY: The policy considerations about
- 13 patent -- about where patent venue ought to be?
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah.
- MR. JAY: No, because it -- Congress decided
- 16 that it was going to -- for purposes of residence it was
- 17 going to adopt a single definition across the board.
- 18 But -- but --
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: I laugh slightly because
- 20 if -- if that is so clear what is this case doing here,
- 21 and -- and it -- that's why -- that's why I can't cut
- 22 one way or the other with that -- that particular
- 23 argument. I mean, you would think the patent holders
- 24 are a tremendously powerful group of people, businesses
- 25 all over the country, and if they had been -- why

- 1 weren't they in Congress? See, that -- that's a
- 2 Congressional problem. Why weren't they there saying we
- 3 have a problem here, why don't you clarify it? You -- I
- 4 don't think you can answer that question --
- 5 MR. JAY: I -- I can --
- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: -- until I get -- you can?
- 7 (Laughter.)
- 8 MR. JAY: Well, sure. Because I think --
- 9 because I think that the issue is not the definition of
- 10 residence. The issue is how do we come up with a
- 11 different patent venue statute altogether? And that is
- 12 something that Congress has been working on, trying to
- 13 come up with something more calibrated, so that, for
- 14 example, a research university would be able to bring
- 15 suit in its home district, because that's where it did
- 16 the invention; it's where the inventor's lab is and so
- 17 forth, you know, where they would want to be able to sue
- 18 a defendant in its own principal place of business, even
- 19 if it doesn't commit the relevant act of infringement
- 20 there.
- 21 And in particular, because, you know, the --
- 22 the second half of the patent venue statute was
- 23 interpreted in a way that requires everything to be
- 24 conjunctive; in other words, all defendants have to have
- 25 committed acts of infringement and have regular and

- 1 established places of business there. You have parent
- 2 subsidiary problems. You have problems when you sue on
- 3 multiple patents, patents which are infringed at
- 4 different times, like the process of making something,
- 5 and then the good that is made. Each of those could be
- 6 different acts of infringement.
- 7 And you also have problems in pharmaceutical
- 8 cases. I think one aspect of patent litigation that is
- 9 working pretty well is these pharmaceutical cases where
- 10 a brand company sues all the generic companies that want
- 11 to make a product that's a -- you know, a facsimile of
- 12 the brand product.
- Congress, in Section 299 of the Patent Act,
- 14 recognized that those are an example of cases that
- 15 really all ought to proceed in the same district. They
- 16 are an exception from the No Consolidation Rule that
- 17 Congress wrote in the America Invents Act.
- So what's going to happen to those cases?
- 19 Number one, there is no act of infringement yet because
- 20 the -- or act of infringement that kicks off the lawsuit
- 21 is an artificial one. And number two, you won't be able
- 22 to sue all those generics in the same district at all.
- 23 Right now, a dozen, or even two dozen, cases can all be
- 24 brought in the same district. It has to be litigated to
- 25 a judgment in 30 months, which is the time -- time

- 1 period that Congress put in the statute. And yet, if --
- 2 if you were going to have to be bringing a dozen suits
- 3 in a dozen districts, that's going to be significantly
- 4 more difficult.
- 5 Ultimately, we don't think that these
- 6 practical problems are dispositive, because we think the
- 7 text and the legislative history, and the reasons why
- 8 the ALI wanted to solve the problems that had come up
- 9 with the previous versions of the undefined term
- 10 "residents" are so clear. Congress wanted a single
- 11 definition that would have cut -- cut across all these
- 12 statutes.
- 13 That might have been --
- 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Then why did -- why did
- 15 Congress reject the ALI proposal to just get rid of
- 16 1400 (b)?
- 17 MR. JAY: Well, I can't cite you a page of
- 18 legislative history, for example, but I think it may
- 19 well have wanted to continue having a rule that, for
- 20 example, requires all defendants to reside in the
- 21 district of venue, which is what 1400(b) now -- now
- 22 provides. Whereas the general venue provision has
- 23 transactional venue, it allows for venue where nobody
- 24 resides, and it also allows for venue sometimes where
- 25 only one defendant resides.

- 1 But we think that Congress could have gone
- 2 through and snipped out all of the venue provisions, or
- 3 portions of venue provisions that were left somewhat
- 4 superfluous by its adoption of this broad definition of
- 5 "resides." The ALI recognizes that would be a mammoth
- 6 task, but nevertheless, Congress decided to do it
- 7 anyway, and to do it this relatively easy way. And I
- 8 think, you know, the Fila venue --
- 9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me your answer
- 10 is quite proper as to 1400(a), but how does your answer
- 11 apply to 1400(b)?
- MR. JAY: How does it apply in terms of work
- 13 left to be done by the rest of the statute?
- 14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yeah. You -- your
- 15 explanation was that they -- they wanted to get rid of
- 16 all of these distinctions, but that doesn't -- and that
- 17 makes sense so far as (a) is concerned, but I don't
- 18 understand how it applies to (b).
- 19 MR. JAY: Well, it -- it wanted to get rid
- 20 of the idea of different conceptions of residents under
- 21 different statutes, and different conceptions of
- 22 residents that applied to different types of defendants.
- 23 It wanted to have all of that standardized.
- Now, that might sometimes result in the word
- 25 "resides" in a venue statute swallowing the rest to some

- 1 degree. I think, you know, this Court, next month, is
- 2 going to consider the Fila venue provision, 45 U.S.C.
- 3 46, I believe. And that venue provision -- it's in the
- 4 list, in, I think, footnote 8 of the House report --
- 5 that footnote incorporates of venue provisions that
- 6 would be encompassed. And it says, "resides or shall be
- 7 doing business."
- Now plainly, that is subsumed by the
- 9 redefinition of "resides," but that is a result that
- 10 Congress was comfortable with.
- 11 Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 13 Five minutes, Mr. Dabney.
- 14 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES W. DABNEY
- 15 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- 16 MR. DABNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
- 17 Getting to the point that Justice Breyer
- 18 made, the domicile of unincorporated associations,
- 19 limited liability companies has not been a problem in
- 20 the law for decades. It has been settled.
- 21 There's a reason they didn't bring it up in
- 22 their brief in opposition. It was never an issue in the
- 23 case. And the place in the Joint Appendix I would
- 24 direct the Court's attention to is page 20A, which is
- 25 the proof of service that they served in this case in

- 1 which the defendant's counsel, in Delaware, filed proofs
- 2 of service stating that the nonresident defendants were
- 3 served with a notice required by, and -- and identifying
- 4 the principal place of business of the defendant.
- 5 The idea that you don't know where the
- 6 domicile is of a chartered entity is something for which
- 7 there is absolutely no evidence in the record. It is --
- 8 it is a complete non-problem --
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What do we do with your
- 10 adversary's last point about the -- all of the cases,
- 11 like the pharmaceutical cases that will be upended and
- 12 made completely impractical by ignoring 1391?
- 13 MR. DABNEY: I don't believe that -- I
- 14 believe that that provision -- that that argument is
- 15 overstated, for various reasons.
- 16 First of all, to the extent that venue
- 17 applies across the board. Of course it will apply to
- 18 putative makers of generic drugs as well. The judicial
- 19 panel on multidistrict litigation exists to provide for
- 20 pre-trial consolidation of proceedings, if that is
- 21 appropriate. Many generic companies have waived any
- 22 objection to venue by -- potentially by registering to
- 23 do business in the places where the brand companies want
- 24 to sue. That was the holding in the Corda case in which
- 25 this Court denied cert on January 9.

- 1 So it is completely speculative to suggest
- 2 that simply upholding what Congress has seen fit to
- 3 provide by way of across-the-board venue protection for
- 4 patent litigation is necessarily going to prevent
- 5 litigation over putative generic drug manufacturers.
- 6 Secondly, the -- the Fourco case was one
- 7 whose critical holding was not based on the then content
- 8 of 1391(c), which, as Justice Kagan correctly pointed
- 9 out, whose breadth was no narrower then than it is now.
- 10 "For venue purposes," "for all venue purposes," it's
- 11 exact; there is no difference there.
- 12 What Fourco was so important is that it held
- 13 that 1400(b) is freestanding. It is not supplemented by
- 14 1391(c). So if we're looking at what 1400(b) means, you
- 15 have a -- a word that has been construed by this Court.
- 16 That construction has never been overruled or changed by
- 17 Congress.
- 18 And in the Pure Oil v. Suarez case in 1966,
- 19 Justice Harlan wrote for a unanimous Court that 1391(c)
- 20 applied to all venue statutes, except where there was a
- 21 restriction, and cited Fourco and the patent venue
- 22 statute as a specific exception. Why? Because the
- 23 structure of 1400(b) that specifically distinguishes
- 24 between resident and nonresident defendants makes no
- 25 sense, unless the statute is given its original meaning.

- 1 You can sue a defendant in the judicial district where
- 2 his domicile is, or if you want to sue somewhere else,
- 3 you have to sue somewhere where there is both an act of
- 4 infringement and a regular established place of
- 5 business. That is what Congress provided.
- 6 And -- and it's very revealing that -- that
- 7 my opponent cites as one argument for overruling Fourco
- 8 is that adoption of -- of the respondent's rule would
- 9 make more even-handed patent infringement cases and
- 10 actions for declaratory judgment. Well, that is simply
- 11 a funnel of salt on 1400(b) itself, because when it
- 12 talks about actions for patent infringement, it's
- 13 talking about the civil action remedy provided by 35
- 14 U.S.C. section 281.
- So those are the only kind of actions that
- 16 1400(b) applies to. So if there is a -- a problem with
- 17 the way Congress wrote the law, that's just too bad.
- 18 That's not for a court to come in and -- and overrule
- 19 precedent in order to achieve a goal like that.
- 20 And I also heard conceded here that,
- 21 whatever might be the motivations for filing a patent
- 22 suit in a particular jurisdiction, it -- it is conceded
- 23 here that it is the interpretation of 1391, and -- and
- 24 the disregard of this Court's Fourco decision that has
- 25 made all this possible.

1	And in in one of the papers that was
2	cited in respondent's own brief, the paper by
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead and finish
4	Finish your point.
5	MR. DABNEY: The the paper by Professors
6	Chien and Risch, that paper cited on page 52 indicates
7	that 68 percent of small- and medium-sized businesses
8	will get venue relief if TC Heartland wins this case.
9	Thank you.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
11	The case is submitted.
12	(Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the case in the
13	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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