

No.

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**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

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ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,  
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
PETITIONER

*v.*

ERIK BRUNETTI

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*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT*

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**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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### QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), provides in pertinent part that a trademark shall be refused registration if it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral \* \* \* or scandalous matter.” The question presented is as follows:

Whether Section 1052(a)’s prohibition on the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

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The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in this case.

### OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., *infra*, 1a-54a) is reported at 877 F.3d 1330. The opinion of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (App., *infra*, 55a-67a) is available at 2014 WL 3976439.

### JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on December 15, 2017. A petition for rehearing was denied on April 12, 2018 (App., *infra*, 68a-69a). On July 5, 2018, the Chief Justice extended the time within which to file

a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including August 10, 2018. On July 31, 2018, the Chief Justice further extended the time to and including September 7, 2018. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

**CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY  
PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

The First Amendment to the Constitution provides, in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law \* \* \* abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. Section 1052 of Title 15 of the United States Code is reproduced in the appendix to this petition. App., *infra*, 70a-73a.

**STATEMENT**

This case involves a facial First Amendment challenge to a century-old provision of federal trademark law that directs the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to refuse registration of trademarks containing “scandalous” or “immoral” matter. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). Respondent sought federal registration for the mark FUCT in connection with a clothing line. The USPTO refused registration under Section 1052(a) on the ground that the mark would be perceived as equivalent to the vulgar word for which it is a homonym. App., *infra*, 55a-67a. The court of appeals held that Section 1052(a)’s ban on federal registration of scandalous or immoral marks is facially invalid under the First Amendment. *Id.* at 1a-54a.

1. A trademark is a “word, name, symbol, or device” used by a person “to identify and distinguish his or her goods” in commerce and “to indicate the source of the goods.” 15 U.S.C. 1127. “[T]rademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of product quality.” *Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.*,



469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). Trademark law also protects the public by preventing competing merchants from misleading consumers through the use of confusingly similar marks, see, e.g., *B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015); *Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.*, 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992), and by favoring marks that “reduce[] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” *Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.*, 514 U.S. 159, 163-164 (1995) (citation omitted).

Federal law does not create trademark rights. See *Matal v. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017); *In re Trade-Mark Cases*, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). Rather, trademarks have been protected by the common law and in equity since the founding, and that protection continues today through the common law and statutes of many States. *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. Federal law, however, has long provided an additional layer of trademark protection. See Act of Feb. 20, 1905 (1905 Act), ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 210-212.

Since 1946, that federal protection has been provided through the Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (15 U.S.C. 1051 *et seq.*). Under the Lanham Act, certain federal remedies for infringement, dilution, and unfair competition are available to owners of all marks used in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of whether a mark is registered. See 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (federal cause of action for representations about the origin of goods or services that are likely to confuse consumers); 15 U.S.C. 1125(b) (importation ban); 15 U.S.C. 1125(d) (remedy for cybersquatting); see also *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1752 (federal cause of action for infringement applies to all mark owners).

Congress has also created a federal registration program that confers additional benefits on owners of registered marks. See *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1752. Registration provides prima facie evidence of the owner’s exclusive right to use the mark in connection with certain goods or services in commerce. 15 U.S.C. 1057(b), 1115(a). Registration also authorizes registrants to use the ® symbol, 15 U.S.C. 1111, and provides constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark, 15 U.S.C. 1072. After a mark has been registered for five years, an owner’s right to use it can become “incontestable” and may be challenged only on very limited grounds. 15 U.S.C. 1065, 1115(b).

The Lanham Act authorizes registration of trademarks that are “used in commerce” and meet certain criteria. 15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1); see 15 U.S.C. 1052 (directing the USPTO to “refuse[] registration” of certain marks “on account of [their] nature”). This case concerns one of the requirements for federal trademark registration—namely, that the mark not consist of or comprise “immoral” or “scandalous” matter. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a).<sup>1</sup> The ban on federal registration of scandalous marks predates the Lanham Act, and it has been a feature of federal trademark-registration programs since 1905. See 1905 Act § 5, 33 Stat. 725. Although the Lanham Act separately bars registration of “scandalous” and “immoral” marks, the USPTO has long treated the

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<sup>1</sup> Other criteria include that the marks not be deceptive, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a); not contain a flag, coat of arms, or insignia of the United States, a State, or a foreign nation, 15 U.S.C. 1052(b); not include a name, portrait, or signature of a living person without his or her consent, 15 U.S.C. 1052(c); not so resemble other marks as to create a likelihood of confusion, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d); not be merely descriptive, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1); and not be functional, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(5).

two terms as composing a single category, and we accordingly refer to them collectively as the “scandalous marks” provision.

To determine whether that ban applies to a particular mark, the USPTO asks whether a “‘substantial composite of the general public’ would find the mark scandalous.” App., *infra*, 3a (citation omitted). The USPTO generally defines “scandalous” as “‘shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . or calling out for condemnation.’” *Ibid.* (citation omitted). The agency understands, and the Federal Circuit has held, that the term includes “[v]ulgar” marks, *i.e.*, those “‘lacking in taste, indelicate, [and] morally crude.’” *Ibid.* (citation omitted; second set of brackets in original). Over the years, the USPTO has refused to register a variety of vulgar and lewd marks based on this provision.<sup>2</sup>

2. This case arises from the USPTO’s refusal of respondent Erik Brunetti’s application to register the mark “FUCT” for his clothing line. Respondent has used the mark in connection with his clothing line since 1990. App., *infra*, 4a. In 2011, he applied for the first time for federal registration of the mark. *Ibid.* A USPTO examining attorney refused registration under Section 1052(a), based on evidence showing that FUCT will be perceived as a scandalous term. See C.A. App. A78-A87, A201-A260.

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<sup>2</sup> A sample of particularly offensive marks that were submitted to the USPTO and that were refused registration under the scandalous-marks provision can be found in the appendix to the government’s supplemental brief in the court of appeals. See U.S. C.A. Suppl. Letter Br. Add. 1 (July 20, 2017).

The USPTO's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) affirmed. App., *infra*, 55a-67a. The Board observed that respondent used the mark in connection with apparel and promotional material displaying “strong, and often explicit, sexual imagery that objectifies women and offers degrading examples of extreme misogyny.” *Id.* at 63a-64a. It found that respondent’s use of the mark would “be perceived by his targeted market segment” as the obscene word for which it is a homonym. *Id.* at 64a. The Board concluded on that basis that the mark was vulgar and therefore unregistrable under 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). App., *infra*, 67a. Although respondent argued that the scandalous-marks provision violated the First Amendment, the Board explained that determining the constitutionality of the provision was beyond its statutory authority. *Ibid.*

3. a. Respondent sought review of the Board’s decision in the Federal Circuit. While the case was pending in the court of appeals, this Court issued its decision in *Matal v. Tam*, *supra*, concerning the constitutionality of Section 1052(a)’s ban on registration of “disparaging” trademarks, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). All eight Justices who participated in *Tam* agreed that the disparagement provision was facially invalid under the First Amendment, but no single rationale commanded a majority of the Court. See 137 S. Ct. at 1751.

b. After supplemental briefing and re-argument in light of *Tam*, the court of appeals reversed the Board’s decision in this case. App., *infra*, 1a-46a. The court first upheld the Board’s determination that respondent’s mark is “scandalous” under Section 1052(a). *Id.* at 6a-10a. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that respondent’s mark is a “phonetic twin” of a vulgar term, and that a “substantial

composite’ of the American public would find the mark vulgar.” *Id.* at 6a-7a, 9a (citation omitted). The court further held that, given those findings, federal registration of the mark was barred by Section 1052(a)’s scandalous-marks provision. *Id.* at 9a-10a.

The court of appeals concluded, however, that Section 1052(a)’s scandalous-marks provision is facially invalid under the First Amendment. App., *infra*, 11a-46a. While assuming *arguendo* that the ban on registration of scandalous marks is viewpoint-neutral, the court held that “the provision impermissibly discriminates based on content in violation of the First Amendment.” *Id.* at 14a. In reaching that conclusion, the court began from the premise that content discrimination of any kind is subject to strict scrutiny unless some alternative First Amendment framework applies. *Id.* at 15a. The court then rejected each of the government’s arguments that the statutory criteria for obtaining the benefits of federal trademark registration should not receive the same First Amendment scrutiny that applies to a content-based prohibition on speech.

The court of appeals rejected the government’s argument that the trademark-registration program should be analyzed as a government subsidy for marks that the government wishes to promote, rather than as a restriction on the marks that are excluded. App., *infra*, 16a-22a. The court distinguished prior decisions recognizing Congress’s broad authority to define the scope of government programs, *e.g.*, *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), on the ground that “[t]rademark registration does not implicate Congress’ power to spend funds.” App., *infra*, 19a. The court concluded that government-subsidy case law does not apply out-

side the Spending Clause context, and that the trademark-registration program is not a spending program. *Id.* at 21a-22a. The court also distinguished precedents related to limited public forums, *id.* at 22a-28a, concluding that limited-public-forum principles apply only when the government restricts speech on its own property, *id.* at 25a.

Having rejected the subsidy and limited-public-forum-frameworks, the court of appeals analyzed the scandalous-marks provision as a direct restriction on speech. The court concluded that the ban on registering scandalous marks regulates speech based on its expressive (and not just commercial) content; that it is not related to the trademark-registration program's commercial purpose of facilitating source identification; and that it is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. App., *infra*, 29a-31a. Noting that the government had not suggested that the provision could survive strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the scandalous-marks provision was facially invalid. *Id.* at 31a.

In the alternative, the court of appeals concluded that the scandalous-marks provision could not survive under the First Amendment standards that apply to regulation of commercial speech. App., *infra*, 31a-42a; see *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n*, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (explaining that First Amendment analysis of restrictions on commercial speech turns on whether (1) the speech being regulated concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances that government interest; and (4) the regulation is "more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest"). The court concluded that the

government has no legitimate substantial interest in declining to encourage graphic sexual images as source identifiers in commerce, because registration does not associate the government with those marks and because speech cannot be suppressed merely because it will be off-putting to others. App., *infra*, 32a-38a. The court further held that, even if the government interest in declining to promote the use of such marks were viewed as legitimate, refusing to register those marks would not advance the government's interest because it would not meaningfully reduce the prevalence of similar terms and images in society at large. *Id.* at 38a-39a. The court further found that the refusal to register scandalous marks mandated by Section 1052(a) is not sufficiently tailored to the government's interest because there is no clear standard for determining which marks are "scandalous," and the USPTO has applied the provision inconsistently in the past. *Id.* at 39a-41a.

c. Judge Dyk concurred in the judgment. App., *infra*, 47a-54a. He "agree[d] with the majority" that this Court's decision in *Tam* "does not dictate the facial invalidity of the immoral-scandalous provision." *Id.* at 47a. Rather than resolve the "serious First Amendment questions" left open in *Tam*, however, Judge Dyk would have avoided those issues by construing the bar on registration of scandalous marks as applicable only to obscene material that is unprotected by the First Amendment. *Id.* at 48a. Judge Dyk concluded that respondent would prevail under that construction "[b]ecause there is no suggestion that Mr. Brunetti's mark is obscene." *Id.* at 54a.

4. The court of appeals denied the government's petition for rehearing en banc without noted dissent. App., *infra*, 68a-69a.

**REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION**

The court of appeals held that the ban on registration of scandalous trademarks imposed by Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), is facially unconstitutional. That holding is incorrect and warrants this Court's review.

The scandalous-marks provision does not prohibit any speech, proscribe any conduct, or restrict the use of any trademark. Nor does it restrict a mark owner's common-law trademark protections. Rather, it simply directs the USPTO to refuse, on a viewpoint-neutral basis, to provide the benefits of federal registration to scandalous marks. Although this Court recently concluded in *Matal v. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), that a different provision of Section 1052(a) was facially unconstitutional, no rationale garnered the assent of a majority of the Court, and neither of the lead opinions in *Tam* endorsed the approach that the court of appeals adopted here. Under the proper analysis, the First Amendment does not prohibit Congress from making vulgar terms and graphic sexual images ineligible for federal trademark registration.

The statutory provision at issue here has guided the USPTO's decisions for 113 years. Absent this Court's review, the ruling below will effectively preclude the USPTO from enforcing Section 1052(a)'s scandalous-marks provision nationwide because any applicant who is refused trademark registration may seek review of the USPTO's decision in the Federal Circuit. The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

**I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INVALIDATION OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS WARRANTS THIS COURT'S REVIEW**

The court of appeals held that Section 1052(a)'s ban on federal registration of immoral or scandalous marks



is facially unconstitutional. See App., *infra*, 46a. Facial invalidation of a statute under the First Amendment is “strong medicine” that should be employed “sparingly and only as a last resort.” *Broadrick v. Oklahoma*, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). And any decision invalidating an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds is significant. See *Rostker v. Goldberg*, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (noting that judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform”) (quoting *Blodgett v. Holden*, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)). This Court has often reviewed holdings that a federal law is invalid under the First Amendment, even in the absence of a circuit split. See, e.g., *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1755; *United States v. Alvarez*, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012); *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1, 14 (2010); *United States v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 467 (2010); *United States v. Williams*, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); *Ashcroft v. ACLU*, 542 U.S. 656, 664 (2004).

Under the decision below, the USPTO may not invoke Section 1052(a) to refuse registration of even the most “shocking” graphic sexual imagery and marks that the court of appeals acknowledged are “lewd, crass, or even disturbing.” App., *infra*, 45a-46a. More generally, by treating eligibility criteria for participation in a voluntary federal program as constitutionally equivalent to affirmative restrictions on speech, the court of appeals has cast doubt on Congress’s ability to determine when the federal government will lend its assistance to private actors. That decision warrants this Court’s review.

## II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SCANDALOUS-MARKS PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In prohibiting the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks, Section 1052(a) does not restrict any speech or restrain any form of expression. The scandalous-marks provision simply reflects Congress’s judgment that the federal government should not affirmatively promote the use of graphic sexual images and vulgar terms by granting them the benefits of registration. The First Amendment does not prohibit Congress from making that judgment.

### A. This Court’s Decision In *Matal v. Tam* Is Not Controlling Here

In *Tam*, this Court held that the disparagement provision in Section 1052(a)—which prohibits registration of marks that “disparage \* \* \* persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute”—violates the First Amendment. 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1753 (citation omitted). No rationale garnered the assent of a majority of the Court, however, and neither of the lead opinions supports the court of appeals’ analysis here.

1. All eight Justices who participated in *Tam* agreed that federal trademark registration confers important legal rights and benefits, and that the trademark-registration program is not government speech. 137 S. Ct. at 1757-1760. But the rest of the Court’s analysis was split between two opinions, neither of which secured a majority.

Justice Alito, writing in relevant part for four Justices, rejected the government’s arguments that the trademark-registration program should be analyzed

under the framework applicable to government subsidies. *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1760-1761. He further concluded that the disparagement provision discriminates based on viewpoint and could not be sustained as a permissible limitation on a government program or limited public forum. *Id.* at 1762-1763. Finally, Justice Alito assumed without deciding that restrictions on trademark registration should be analyzed under the standard applicable to restrictions on commercial speech, and he concluded that the disparagement provision could not be sustained because it was not sufficiently tailored to a substantial governmental interest. *Id.* at 1763-1765.

Justice Kennedy, writing on behalf of the four remaining Justices, concurred on narrower grounds. Those Justices did not reject the government’s argument that the trademark-registration program is properly analyzed as a government subsidy. Rather, they concluded that the disparagement provision “constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny”—and that such discrimination made it unnecessary to further consider the appropriate framework for evaluating the constitutionality of Section 1052(a)’s criteria for federal registration. *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1765; see *id.* at 1768 (“[T]he Court’s precedents have recognized just one narrow situation in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible: where the government itself is speaking or recruiting others to communicate a message on its behalf.”).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Although Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s First Amendment analysis in full, he also filed a short concurrence expressing the view that the disparagement provision should be subject to strict scrutiny even if it affects only commercial speech. *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1769.

2. a. This Court’s decision in *Tam* is not controlling here. See App., *infra*, 14a; *id.* at 47a-48a (Dyk, J., concurring). Because Justice Kennedy found that the disparagement provision discriminates based on viewpoint, he reserved “the question of how other [viewpoint-neutral] provisions of the Lanham Act should be analyzed under the First Amendment.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1768. And while Justice Alito addressed the government’s arguments in greater detail, most of his opinion did not speak for the Court, and both the portions that did and those that did not command a majority emphasized the viewpoint-discriminatory character of the disparagement provision. See *id.* at 1758, 1760 (majority op.); *id.* at 1763 (Alito, J.).

Although the court of appeals expressed doubt on the point, App., *infra*, 14a, it ultimately did not break with the significant body of precedent holding that restrictions on the use of profanity and sexual images are viewpoint neutral. See, e.g., *Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser*, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (describing “lewd and indecent speech” that was “unrelated to any political viewpoint”); *Perry v. McDonald*, 280 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that prohibition on using “combination of letters that stands in part for the word ‘shit’ . . . does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint”); *General Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen*, 131 F.3d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Congress has regulated \* \* \* a particular subject matter—lascivious depictions of nudity including sexual or excretory activities or organs—not those reflecting particular viewpoints.”), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998); *id.* at 280-282; *PMG Int’l Div., L.L.C. v. Rumsfeld*, 303 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (similar). By prohibiting the registration of such terms

by all commercial actors, the scandalous-marks provision does not affect expression on only one side of “an otherwise includible subject.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J.) (citation omitted). Nor is the “motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker” the rationale for the limitation. *Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.*, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). The scandalous-marks provision precludes the federal registration of respondent’s mark not because of any view, opinion, or perspective expressed by that mark, but because respondent “us[ed] a combination of letters that stands \* \* \* for” a vulgar and obscene term. *Perry*, 280 F.3d at 170.

b. Relying in part on *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015), the court of appeals stated that “[c]ontent-based statutes are presumptively invalid” and “must withstand strict scrutiny” in order to survive First Amendment review. App., *infra*, 15a. That reasoning closely tracks the Federal Circuit’s prior analysis in *Tam*. See *In re Tam*, 808 F.3d 1321, 1339 (2016) (en banc) (“Because § 2(a) discriminates on the basis of the content of the message conveyed by the speech, it follows that it is presumptively invalid, and must satisfy strict scrutiny to be found constitutional.”). But when *Tam* reached this Court, neither of the lead opinions concluded that strict scrutiny applies to viewpoint-neutral limitations on the registrability of trademarks. Indeed, content-based restrictions on registration are a longstanding feature of federal trademark law, including in provisions that have never been viewed as constitutionally suspect. See p. 4 n.1, *supra*.

### B. Section 1052(a) Does Not Restrict Speech

Properly analyzed, Section 1052(a)'s bar on federal registration of scandalous marks is not an unconstitutional "abridg[ement of] the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. Amend. I.

1. Section 1052(a) does not restrict the terms or images that may lawfully be used as trademarks. A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device" used by a person "to identify and distinguish his or her goods" in commerce and "to indicate the source of the goods." 15 U.S.C. 1127. Trademark rights are created not by federal law, but by use of a mark to identify goods and services in commerce. See *B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015) (explaining that "federal law does not create trademarks"; rather, a person who "first uses a distinct mark in commerce \* \* \* acquires rights to that mark"); see also *In re Trade-Mark Cases*, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).

Even without federal registration, respondent may use vulgar terms or symbols to identify his goods in commerce, and he may seek to enforce his chosen mark in both state and federal courts against others whom he believes have misused it or have misappropriated any goodwill associated with it. Respondent may invoke both common-law protections and Lanham Act remedies, such as a cause of action for false association, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); a prohibition on importing goods bearing confusingly similar marks, 15 U.S.C. 1125(b); protection against cybersquatting, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d); and authorization of treble-damages awards for certain types of infringement, 15 U.S.C. 1117(a). See *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1752-1753.

2. The court of appeals therefore erred in treating Section 1052(a)'s scandalous-marks provision as an affirmative restriction on speech. Section 1052 defines the categories of marks that are not "registrable on [the] principal register." 15 U.S.C. 1052. If a mark does not satisfy the statutory criteria, the only consequence is that it is refused registration. Although refusal of registration renders certain federal benefits unavailable, "a valid trademark may still be used in commerce." *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1752.

Since 1990, respondent has used and promoted his unregistered mark in connection with his clothing line. App., *infra*, 4a. Indeed, the court of appeals recognized that, "[r]egardless of whether a trademark is federally registered, an applicant can still brand clothing with his mark, advertise with it on the television or radio, or place it on billboards along the highway." *Id.* at 38a. The court counter-intuitively concluded, however, that this fact weighed *against* the constitutionality of the scandalous-marks provision, on the theory that the registration ban would do little to reduce the prevalence of scandalous commercial speech. *Id.* at 38a-39a.

Citing this Court's decision in *United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803 (2000), the court of appeals found that strict scrutiny presumptively applies to any content-based discrimination "whether a government statute bans or merely burdens protected speech." App., *infra*, 15a (citing *Playboy*, 529 U.S. at 812). But the criteria for federal registration in Section 1052(a) are nothing like the restrictions at issue in *Playboy*. Although the provision struck down in *Playboy* did not impose a "complete prohibition" on sexually explicit television programming, its practical effect was to compel a substantial number of cable operators to

“silence[.]” such programming “for two-thirds of the day in every home in a cable service area.” 529 U.S. at 812. By contrast, Section 1052(a) does not restrict respondent’s ability to express himself, through use of his mark or otherwise, but simply denies him the advantages associated with federal trademark registration.

**C. The Scandalous-Marks Provision Establishes A Lawful Eligibility Requirement For Federal Trademark Registration**

1. In a variety of contexts, this Court has distinguished between restrictions on speech and the refusal to provide government benefits or other resources in support of expressive activity. That distinction follows from the First Amendment’s text, which “prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech’” but “does not confer an affirmative right” to government assistance in speaking. *Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n*, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009) (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. I). Recognizing that distinction, this Court has “reject[ed] the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.” *Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.*, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has also consistently recognized that the government may “selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).

Congress’s directive that the USPTO refuse federal trademark registration to vulgar words and lewd sexual images is consistent with those First Amendment principles. Congress legitimately determined that a federal



agency should not use government funds to issue certificates “in the name of the United States of America” conferring statutory benefits for use of vulgar words and lewd sexual images. 15 U.S.C. 1057(a). Although respondent has a First Amendment right to use a vulgar word as a mark for his clothing line, he has no comparable right to require the government to register vulgar terms, issue registration certificates for them in the name of the United States, inscribe them on the USPTO’s Principal Register, and bestow valuable benefits on the markholders’ use of the terms in commerce.

That does not mean that the criteria for federal trademark registration are beyond constitutional scrutiny. As the Court’s *Tam* decision establishes, such criteria must be viewpoint-neutral to survive Free Speech Clause review. The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine also provides robust protection against any attempt by the government to leverage the trademark-registration program to “regulate speech outside the contours” of the program. See *Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.*, 570 U.S. 205, 214-215 (2013). And other constitutional provisions afford additional protection against, for example, denying registration on the basis of a suspect classification, such as race or national origin, see *Regan*, 461 U.S. at 546-547, or on account of the markholder’s religious identity or beliefs, see *Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer*, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017).

None of those constitutional limitations has been violated here. Unlike the disparagement provision that the Court struck down in *Tam*, the scandalous-marks provision is viewpoint-neutral. See pp. 14-15, *supra*. It does not restrict any registrant’s speech or otherwise regulate conduct outside the registration program. See

*Agency for Int'l Dev.*, 570 U.S. at 218-219. Respondent may register any non-scandalous mark that satisfies the statutory criteria, while continuing to use unregistered vulgar marks and other vulgar speech to market and promote his goods in commerce. And respondent does not allege, and the court below did not suggest, that the scandalous-marks provision discriminates based on a suspect classification or a registration applicant's religious identity or beliefs.

2. The court of appeals erred in deeming this Court's government-subsidy decisions inapplicable.

a. The court of appeals described the Court's government-subsidy precedents as applying only to programs that "involve[] financial benefits" or "implicate Congress' power to spend funds." App., *infra*, 19a, 21a (citation omitted). But the principle that the First Amendment does not confer an affirmative right to government assistance does not depend on the form of the assistance offered. This Court's decisions in *Ysursa* and in *Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'n*, 551 U.S. 177 (2007)—both of which the court of appeals simply ignored—involved forms of assistance other than the direct provision of money. In each of those cases, the crucial point was that, as here, the plaintiff had sought government support or assistance for its communicative efforts, rather than simply the right to speak free from government interference.

b. The court of appeals also found "no principled basis to distinguish between the registration of trademarks and the registration of copyrights under the government program rationale." App., *infra*, 22a. But neither the government's argument nor this Court's decisions imply that limits on government programs are wholly exempt from constitutional scrutiny. See p. 19,

*supra*. If Congress barred the U.S. Copyright Office from registering copyrights in particular types of creative works, the First Amendment analysis would depend in part on the precise legal consequences that denial of registration entailed and on the justifications offered for the ban. But to the extent that the hypothetical statute would more greatly burden expression than does the denial of trademark registration (*e.g.*, because of differences between trademarks and copyrights, because the hypothetical law would deny registration to an entire work based on isolated words, or because it would preempt state registration programs), the First Amendment inquiry could take account of that greater burden. In conducting that analysis, moreover, a court could consider the different purposes that trademark and copyright laws have historically served, see, *e.g.*, *Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003), and the special role that copyright has historically played as “the engine of free expression,” *Eldred v. Ashcroft*, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).

3. The court of appeals made two other important errors.

a. The court of appeals failed to recognize that the trademark-registration program operates exclusively in the sphere of commercial speech. See *San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.*, 483 U.S. 522, 535 (1987). This case involves a dispute not about political speech, but about use of a mark to identify goods and services in commerce. See *Friedman v. Rogers*, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (explaining that trade names are used to identify source and to symbolize the goodwill associated with the source, not to “editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political”). Even if Section 1052(a) actually restricted

speech (*e.g.*, by proscribing the use of certain terms or symbols as names of businesses, products, or services), the standards set out in *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission*, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), would apply.

As explained above, Section 1052(a) does not prohibit or restrict speech, but instead establishes eligibility criteria for a particular form of federal assistance. But just as restrictions on commercial speech are subject to less demanding First Amendment scrutiny than other speech restrictions, the fact that the advantages conferred by federal trademark registration are economic in nature provides a further reason to uphold the viewpoint-neutral eligibility criterion at issue here.

b. The court of appeals likewise erred in dismissing the government’s legitimate justifications for denying the benefits of federal trademark registration to sexually explicit content. “[S]ociety’s interest in protecting [sexually explicit] expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammelled political debate.” *City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.*, 475 U.S. 41, 49 n.2 (1986) (citation omitted); see *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009) (recognizing that “references to excretory and sexual material surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The decision below would force the government to register “highly offensive, even shocking, images” and profanities that fall squarely within the ambit of these precedents. App., *infra*, 45a; see p. 5 n.2, *supra*.

The court of appeals stated that “the government does not have a substantial interest in protecting the public from scandalousness and profanities,” and that the scandalous-marks provision cannot meaningfully

advance any government interest because “[i]n this electronic/Internet age, to the extent that the government seeks to protect the general population from scandalous material, with all due respect, it has completely failed.” App., *infra*, 36a, 38a-39a. But the fact that lewd speech is readily accessible to those who seek it out should not obligate the government actively to promote its use. The benefits of federal trademark registration—which include nationwide constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership in the mark and certain presumptions in litigation—flow directly from the government’s examining the mark, publishing it on the USPTO’s Principal Register, permitting registrants to use the ® symbol to notify the public that the mark is federally registered, and working with other countries’ governments to facilitate international protection of the mark.

Governments commonly exclude lewd pictures, profanity, and sexually explicit imagery from non-public and limited public fora. A city government might decide, for instance, that graphic sexual imagery should not appear on advertisements on city buses. Or the federal government might impose similar restrictions on expression within a military cemetery. If (as the court of appeals concluded) the government has no legitimate interest in protecting the public from scandalous images, App., *infra*, 36a, the constitutionality of such reasonable regulations might be called into doubt.

Registration of a trademark does not signal government endorsement of any particular product, service, mark, name, or registrant. But the government’s registration of a scandalous term as a trademark, which results in publication of that mark on the Principal Register and allows the registrant to use the mark with the ® symbol, would convey to the public that the United

States regards scandalous images and terms as appropriate source identifiers in commerce.<sup>4</sup> Congress could also reasonably conclude that commercial actors are more likely to choose marks for which the advantages of federal registration are available, and it could reasonably decline to provide this incentive to the use of sexual imagery and other scandalous marks. Those government interests are fully sufficient to justify Section 1052(a)'s exclusion of such marks from the federal trademark-registration program.

### III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT

The provision at issue here requires the USPTO to refuse registration to marks containing profanities and graphic sexual images, such as renderings of genitalia or sexual acts. Many attempts have already been made to register “highly offensive, even shocking, images,” App., *infra*, 45a; see p. 5 n.2, *supra*, and more such applications are likely to be submitted if the court of appeals’ decision is allowed to stand.

Congress has prohibited federal registration of trademarks containing scandalous matter since the registration system was created in 1905. See 1905 Act § 5, 33 Stat. 725. The USPTO has repeatedly applied these provisions to refuse registration of scandalous marks. The court below nevertheless invalidated Section 1052(a)'s scandalous-marks provision on its face, so that the USPTO cannot invoke it to refuse registration of even the most vulgar terms and lewd sexual images.

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<sup>4</sup> That is especially true because owners of registered marks may ask the USPTO to transmit their applications to international bodies for recognition. See 15 U.S.C. 1141b (Madrid Protocol); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6<sup>quinquies</sup>, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1643, 828 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing for transmittal of certificates of registration to other countries).

By statute, any applicant who is refused trademark registration may seek review of the USPTO's decision in the Federal Circuit. See 15 U.S.C. 1071(a); 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(B). Pending the Court's disposition of this petition, the USPTO therefore has suspended action on trademark applications that otherwise would be refused under the scandalous-marks provision of Section 1052(a). See USPTO, *Examination Guide 2-18: Examination Guidance for Compliance with Section 2(a)'s Scandalousness Provision While Constitutionality Remains in Question during Period to Petition for Certiorari to U.S. Supreme Court* (May 24, 2018), <http://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-and-manuals/trademark-examination-guides>. Unless this Court reviews and sets aside the Federal Circuit's decision in this case, there is consequently no meaningful likelihood that any further dispute concerning the constitutionality of the scandalous-marks provision will again be presented for judicial resolution.

#### CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

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SEPTEMBER 2018

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

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No. 2015-1109

IN RE: ERIK BRUNETTI, APPELLANT

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Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark  
Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in  
No. 85310960.

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Decided: Dec. 15, 2017

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Before: DYK, MOORE, and STOLL, *Circuit Judges*.

Opinion for the Court filed by *Circuit Judge* MOORE.

Concurring opinion filed by *Circuit Judge* DYK.

MOORE, *Circuit Judge*.

Erik Brunetti appeals from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark FUCT because it comprises immoral or scandalous matter under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“§ 2(a)"). We hold substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings and it did not err concluding the mark comprises immoral or scandalous matter. We conclude, however, that § 2(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. We therefore reverse the Board’s holding that Mr. Brunetti’s mark is unregistrable.



## BACKGROUND

## I. Section 2(a)'s Bar on Registration of Immoral or Scandalous Marks

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act provides that the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) may refuse to register a trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). While § 2(a) identifies “immoral” and “scandalous” subject matter as separate bases to refuse to register a trademark—and are provisions separated by the “deceptive” provision—the PTO generally applies the bar on immoral or scandalous marks as a unitary provision (“the immoral or scandalous provision”). *See* TMEP § 1203.01 (“Although the words ‘immoral’ and ‘scandalous’ may have somewhat different connotations, case law has included immoral matter in the same category as scandalous matter.”); *In re McGinley*, 660 F.2d 481, 485 n.6 (CCPA 1981) (“Because of our holding, *infra*, that appellant’s mark is ‘scandalous,’ it is unnecessary to consider whether appellant’s mark is ‘immoral.’ We note the dearth of reported trademark decisions in which the term ‘immoral’ has been directly applied.”); *see also* Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, *Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral*, 101 Trademark Rep. 1476, 1489 (2011) (“U.S. courts and the Board have not distinguished between ‘immoral’ and ‘scandalous’ and have focused on whether marks are scandalous or offensive rather than contrary to some accepted standard of morality.” (citation omit-

ted)). The bar on immoral or scandalous marks was first codified in 1905, *see* Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5(a), 33 Stat. 724, 725, and reenacted in the Lanham Act in 1946, Pub. L. 79-489, § 2(a), 60 Stat. 427, 428 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).

To determine whether a mark should be disqualified under § 2(a), the PTO asks whether a “substantial composite of the general public” would find the mark scandalous, defined as “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . or calling out for condemnation.” *In re Fox*, 702 F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (alterations omitted) (quoting *In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd.*, 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Alternatively, “the PTO may prove scandalousness by establishing that a mark is ‘vulgar.’” *Id.* (quoting *In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Vulgar marks are “lacking in taste, indelicate, [and] morally crude . . . .” *See McGinley*, 660 F.2d at 486 (quoting *In re Runsdorf*, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443, 443-44 (1971)). The PTO makes a determination as to whether a mark is scandalous “in the context of contemporary attitudes” and “in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods described in the application.” *Fox*, 702 F.3d at 635 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting *Mavety*, 33 F.3d at 1371).

Because the scandalousness determination is made in the context of contemporary attitudes, the concept of what is actually immoral or scandalous changes over time. Early cases often, but not always, focused on religious words or symbols. *See, e.g., In re Riverbank Canning Co.*, 95 F.2d 327, 329 (CCPA 1938) (MADONNA

for wine); *Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co.*, 37 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Comm'r Pat. 1938) (QUEEN MARY for women's underwear); *Ex Parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc.*, 59 U.S.P.Q. 22 (Comm'r Pat. 1943) (AGNUS DEI for safes); *In re P. J. Valckenberg, Gmbh*, 122 U.S.P.Q. 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (MADONNA for wine); *In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H.*, 122 U.S.P.Q. 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (SENUSSI (a Muslim sect that forbids smoking) for cigarettes); *In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comerical Dos Vinhos Messias, S.A.R.L.*, 159 U.S.P.Q. 275 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (MESSIAS for wine and brandy). In later cases, the PTO rejected a wider variety of marks as scandalous. *See, e.g., Runsdorf*, 171 U.S.P.Q. at 443 (BUBBY TRAP for brassieres); *McGinley*, 660 F.2d at 482 (mark consisting of "a photograph of a nude man and woman kissing and embracing in a manner appearing to expose the male genitalia" for a swingers newsletter); *In re Tinseltown, Inc.*, 212 U.S.P.Q. 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (BULLSHIT on handbags, purses, and other personal accessories); *Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc.*, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (mark depicting a defecating dog); *Mavety*, 33 F.3d 1367 (BLACK TAIL for adult entertainment magazines).

## II. Facts of This Case

Mr. Brunetti owns the clothing brand "fuct," which he founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application (No. 85/310,960) for the mark FUCT for various items of apparel. The original applicants assigned the application to Mr. Brunetti, who amended it to allege use of the mark. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scan-

dalous matter. The examining attorney reasoned that FUCT is the past tense of the verb “fuck,” a vulgar word, and is therefore scandalous. J.A. 203.

Mr. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Board. The examining attorney denied reconsideration, and the Board affirmed. In its decision, the Board stated the dictionary definitions in the record uniformly characterize the word “fuck” as offensive, profane, or vulgar. The Board noted that the word “fuct” is defined by Urban Dictionary as the past tense of the verb “fuck” and pronounced the same as the word “fucked,” and therefore found it is “recognized as a slang and literal equivalent of the word ‘fucked,’” with “the same vulgar meaning.” J.A. 6-7 & n.6. Based on the examining attorney’s Google Images search results, the Board stated Mr. Brunetti used the mark in the context of “strong, and often explicit, sexual imagery that objectifies women and offers degrading examples of extreme misogyny,” with a theme “of extreme nihilism—displaying an unending succession of anti-social imagery of executions, despair, violent and bloody scenes including dismemberment, hellacious or apocalyptic events, and dozens of examples of other imagery lacking in taste.” J.A. 8-9. The Board explained that Mr. Brunetti’s use of the mark “will be perceived by his targeted market segment as the phonetic equivalent of the wor[d] ‘fucked.’” J.A. 9. In light of the record, it found Mr. Brunetti’s assertion that the mark “was chosen as an invented or coined term stretches credulity.” *Id.* It concluded that the mark is vulgar and therefore unregistrable under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Mr. Brunetti appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4).

## DISCUSSION

Mr. Brunetti argues substantial evidence does not support the Board's finding the mark FUCT is vulgar under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. He argues even if the mark is vulgar, § 2(a) does not expressly prohibit the registration of vulgar marks and a mark should be approved for registration when there is doubt as to its meaning, as he alleges there is here. Alternatively, Mr. Brunetti challenges the constitutionality of § 2(a)'s bar on immoral or scandalous marks.

I. The Mark FUCT is Vulgar and Therefore Scandalous

The determination that a mark is scandalous is a conclusion of law based upon underlying factual inquiries. *Fox*, 702 F.3d at 637. We review the Board's factual findings for substantial evidence and its ultimate conclusion de novo. *Id.* Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla" and "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate" to support a conclusion. *Consol. Edison v. NLRB*, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

It is undisputed that the word "fuck" is vulgar. Dictionaries in the record characterize the word as "taboo," "one of the most offensive" English words, "almost universally considered vulgar," and an "extremely offensive expression." J.A. 5-6; J.A. 206 (Collins Online Dictionary); J.A. 209 (Vocabulary.com); J.A. 211 (Wikipedia.com); J.A. 351 (MacMillan Dictionary). Mr. Brunetti argues that the vulgarity of "fuck" is irrelevant to whether the mark FUCT is vulgar. We do not agree.

Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that "fuct" is a "phonetic twin" of "fucked," the past

tense of the word “fuck.” J.A. 10. Urban Dictionary defines “fuct” as the “past tense of the verb fuck.” J.A. 83. MacMillan Dictionary indicates that the word “fucked” is pronounced phonetically as /fʌkt/, which the Board found sounds like “fukt” or “fuct.” J.A. 6 & n.6. This evidence linking the two terms is sufficient to render the vulgarity of the word “fuck” relevant to the vulgarity of Mr. Brunetti’s mark.

Evidence of the use of Mr. Brunetti’s mark in the marketplace further buttresses the Board’s finding of a link between the mark and the word “fuck.” The Board found the term “fuct” is used on products containing sexual imagery and that consumers perceive the mark as having “an unmistakable aura of negative sexual connotations.” J.A. 9. One T-shirt—captioned the “FUCT Orgy” shirt—depicts a group sex scene. J.A. 346. Another T-shirt contains the word “FUCK” in yellow letters, with a “T” superimposed over the “K” such that the word FUCK is still visible. J.A. 325. A third T-shirt has the brand name FUCT depicted above the slogan “1970 smokin dope & fucking in the streets.” J.A. 312. Because one meaning of “fuck” is “to have sex with someone,” the placement of the mark on products containing sexual imagery makes it more likely that the mark will be perceived as the phonetic equivalent of the word “fucked.” J.A. 9.

Mr. Brunetti challenges the evidence on which the Board relied in making the vulgarity finding. He argues that Urban Dictionary is not a standard dictionary edited by lexicographers and the author of the definition cited by the Board lacks lexicographic expertise. He argues that the Board did not consider his current line of products, which he provided to the examining

attorney, but instead relied on a random collection of outdated products collected from Google Images. He argues the Board should not have considered these images because they lack foundation, are inadmissible hearsay, and are irrelevant to the current perception of the mark in the marketplace. He also argues that the majority of the marked products contain no sexual imagery.

Mr. Brunetti's arguments have no merit. For ex parte proceedings, the Board permits the examining attorney to consider materials from the Internet, having adopted a "somewhat more permissive stance with respect to the admissibility and probative value of evidence." TBMP §§ 1208, 1208.03. The pedigree of the author of a definition may affect the weight that evidence is given but does not render the definition irrelevant. Similarly, the ages of the images collected by the examining attorney may affect evidentiary weight, not relevance.

Mr. Brunetti also argues that the Board ignored probative evidence that the mark is not vulgar. He argues that both he and the owner of a high-end clothing store declared that the mark was not vulgar. He argues that the meaning of the term "fuct" is ambiguous, but that to the extent it has any meaning, it is "Friends yoU Can't Trust." See *Mavety*, 33 F.3d at 1374 ("commend[ing] the practice" of erring on the side of publication when marks are not clearly scandalous). He claims that in over twenty years of operation, he received only a single complaint about his brand name and the brand is mass-distributed by "high-end national retailers" like Urban Outfitters. Appellant's Br. 8. Finally, he argues that two of Urban Dictionary's seven

definitions of the term “fuct” refer to his brand name, while only one definition is vulgar.

Mr. Brunetti’s proffered evidence does not change our conclusion that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. The Board explicitly considered Mr. Brunetti’s declaration and found it “stretche[d] credulity” that “fuct” was chosen as an invented or coined term for “Friends yoU Can’t Trust,” given the contradictory record evidence. J.A. 9-10. Mr. Brunetti’s unverifiable claim about the number of customer complaints may demonstrate that the mark is not offensive to a certain segment of the market. That does not satisfy his burden on appeal, however, to establish that the Board lacked substantial evidence for its determination that a “substantial composite” of the American public would find the mark vulgar. And the fact that the Board could have relied on one of the other five definitions of the term “fuct” on Urban Dictionary—a website to which anyone can anonymously submit definitions—does not demonstrate that the Board’s reliance on that website is not substantial evidence. The Board reasonably focused on the highest rated definition, suggesting that it is more common or accurate than the alternative, non-vulgar definitions.

Mr. Brunetti argues that even if FUCT is vulgar, § 2(a) does not prohibit the registration of vulgar marks—only “immoral” or “scandalous” marks. He argues that to be immoral or scandalous, a mark must be more than merely vulgar. He argues that extending § 2(a) to vulgar marks is contrary to the plain language of the statute.

We do not agree. We have previously held “the PTO may prove scandalousness by establishing that a mark



is ‘vulgar.’” *Fox*, 702 F.3d at 635; *see also Boulevard Entm’t*, 334 F.3d at 1340 (“A showing that a mark is vulgar is sufficient to establish that it ‘consists of or comprises immoral . . . or scandalous matter’ within the meaning of section 1052(a).”). We are bound by these holdings.

Even if we could overrule our prior holding that a showing of vulgarity is sufficient to establish that a mark “consists of or comprises immoral . . . or scandalous matter,” we see no justification for doing so in light of the evidence of record. At the time of the passage of the Lanham Act, dictionaries defined “scandalous” as “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety,” “[g]iving offense to the conscience or moral feelings,” or “calling out [for] condemnation.” *McGinley*, 660 F.2d at 485-86 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1942); Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary (1945)). Other definitions characterize scandalous as “disgraceful,” “offensive,” or “disreputable.” *Id.* (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1942); Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary (1945)). We see no definition of scandalous that, in light of the PTO’s fact findings, would exempt Mr. Brunetti’s mark.

We see no merit in Mr. Brunetti’s arguments relating to whether the mark is scandalous and therefore prohibited registration under § 2(a). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding the mark FUCTION is vulgar and therefore the Board did not err in concluding the mark is not registrable under § 2(a).

## II. Section 2(a)'s Bar on Immoral or Scandalous Marks is Unconstitutional Under the First Amendment

When Mr. Brunetti filed his appeal, his constitutional argument was foreclosed by binding precedent. In *McGinley*, our predecessor court held the refusal to register a mark under § 2(a) does not bar the applicant from using the mark, and therefore does not implicate the First Amendment. 660 F.2d at 484. Commentators heavily criticized *McGinley* and our continued reliance on it, particularly in light of the many changes to First Amendment jurisprudence over the last thirty years. *In re Tam*, 808 F.3d 1321, 1333-34 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). We reconsidered *McGinley* en banc in *Tam*, which held the disparagement provision of § 2(a) unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of content, message, and viewpoint. *Id.* at 1334-37, 1358. We held that, although trademarks serve a commercial purpose as source identifiers in the marketplace, the disparagement provision of § 2(a) related to the expressive character of marks, not their commercial purpose. *Id.* at 1337-39. As either a content-based or viewpoint-based regulation of expressive speech, the disparagement provision was subject to strict scrutiny. *Id.* at 1339. It was undisputed that the measure did not survive such scrutiny. *Id.*

We rejected the government's arguments that § 2(a) did not implicate the First Amendment, holding instead that the PTO's denial of marks had a chilling effect on speech. *Id.* at 1339-45. We also rejected the government's arguments that trademark registration was government speech, *id.* at 1345-48, and that trademark registration was a federal subsidy, *id.* at 1348-55. Fi-

nally, we held the disparagement provision did not survive even the lesser scrutiny afforded to commercial speech under *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission*, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980), because the government had put forth no substantial interests justifying the regulation of speech. *Tam*, 808 F.3d at 1355-58.

The en banc court noted that § 2(a) contains a hodgepodge of differing prohibitions on registration, and as such, the holding in *Tam* was limited to § 2(a)'s disparagement provision. *Id.* at 1330; *see also id.* at 1330 n.1. However, the court left open whether other portions of § 2 may also be unconstitutional, and held that *McGinley* was overruled insofar as it could prevent a future panel from reconsidering the constitutionality of other portions of § 2. *Id.* at 1330 n.1.

Following the issuance of our en banc decision in *Tam*, we requested additional briefing from both parties in this case on “the impact of the *Tam* decision on Mr. Brunetti’s case, and in particular whether there is any basis for treating immoral and scandalous marks differently than disparaging marks.” *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 51 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2015). Both parties filed letter briefs. The government stated that “given the breadth of the Court’s *Tam* decision and in view of the totality of the Court’s reasoning,” there is no reasonable basis for treating immoral or scandalous marks differently than disparaging marks. Gov’t Letter Br. 2, *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 52 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016). It maintained, however, that if the Solicitor General sought Supreme Court review of our en banc decision in *Tam*, “the government may argue that, under reasoning less sweeping

than that adopted in *Tam*, the bar on registration of scandalous and immoral marks would survive even if the bar on registration of disparaging marks were held invalid.” *Id.* at 4. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. *Lee v. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).

On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed our en banc decision in *Tam*. *Matal v. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). The Court held that trademarks are private, not government, speech. *Id.* at 1757-61. Pursuant to two opinions authored by Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy, it concluded that § 2(a)’s bar on the registration of disparaging marks discriminated based on viewpoint. *Id.* at 1763 (Alito, J.); *id.* at 1765 (Kennedy, J.). The Court explained the disparagement provision “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” *Id.* at 1751 (Alito, J.); *accord id.* at 1766 (Kennedy, J.). The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer, further concluded that the constitutionality of the disparagement provision could not be sustained by analyzing trademark registration as either a federal subsidy or a federal program. *Id.* at 1760-63 (Alito, J.). The remaining four participating Justices opined, in a concurring opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, that “the viewpoint discrimination rationale renders unnecessary any extended treatment of other questions raised by the parties.” *Id.* at 1765 (Kennedy, J.).

Both opinions held the disparagement provision unconstitutionally restricted free speech, left open was “the question of whether *Central Hudson* provides the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges to

provisions of the Lanham Act.” *Id.* at 1764 n.17 (Alito, J.); *see also id.* at 1767 (Kennedy, J.). Justice Alito’s opinion concluded the disparagement provision failed even the intermediate test under *Central Hudson* because the prohibition was not narrowly drawn to a substantial government interest. *Id.* at 1764-65 (Alito, J.). Justice Kennedy’s opinion concluded that, because the disparagement provision discriminates based on viewpoint, it was subject to heightened scrutiny, which it did not withstand. *Id.* at 1767-68 (Kennedy, J.). Neither opinion reached the constitutionality of other provisions of § 2 of the Lanham Act. *See, e.g., id.* at 1768 (Kennedy, J.).

Following the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Tam*, we requested additional briefing from the parties regarding the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision on Mr. Brunetti’s case. *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 58 (Fed. Cir. June 20, 2017). Both parties submitted letter briefs and we heard oral argument on August 29, 2017. The government contends *Tam* does not resolve the constitutionality of § 2(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks because the disparagement provision implicates viewpoint discrimination, whereas the immoral or scandalous provision is viewpoint neutral. Gov’t Letter Br. 6-9, *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017).

While we question the viewpoint neutrality of the immoral or scandalous provision, we need not resolve that issue. Independent of whether the immoral or scandalous provision is viewpoint discriminatory, we conclude the provision impermissibly discriminates based on content in violation of the First Amendment.

A. Section 2(a)'s Bar on Registering Immoral  
or Scandalous Marks is an Unconstitutional Content-  
Based Restriction on Speech

The government restricts speech based on content when “a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). Content-based statutes are presumptively invalid. *RAV v. City of St. Paul, Minn.*, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). To survive, such statutes must withstand strict scrutiny review, which requires the government to “prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” *Reed*, 135 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting *Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett*, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011)); *United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”). Strict scrutiny applies whether a government statute bans or merely burdens protected speech. *See Playboy*, 529 U.S. at 812 (“The Government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.”).

The government concedes that § 2(a)'s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is a content-based restriction on speech. Oral Arg. at 11:57-12:05. And the government does not assert that the immoral or scandalous provision survives strict scrutiny review. Instead, the government contends § 2(a)'s content-based bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks does not implicate the First Amendment because trademark

registration is either a government subsidy program or limited public forum. Gov't Letter Br. 14, *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017); Oral Arg. at 12:06-21, 18:15-39. Alternatively, the government argues trademarks are commercial speech implicating only the intermediate level of scrutiny set forth in *Central Hudson*. Gov't Letter Br. 15, *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017); Oral Arg. at 35:05-17. Under a less exacting degree of scrutiny, the government argues the immoral or scandalous provision is an appropriate content-based restriction tailored to substantial government interests. We consider these arguments in turn.

1. Trademark Registration is Not a Government Subsidy Program

The Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution “provides Congress broad discretion to tax and spend for the ‘general Welfare,’ including by funding particular state or private programs or activities.” *Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.*, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327-28 (2013); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Within this discretion is the authority to attach certain conditions to the use of its funds “to ensure they are used in the manner Congress intends.” *Id.* at 2328; *see also Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (“The condition that federal funds will be used only to further the purposes of a grant does not violate constitutional rights.”). Other government-imposed conditions may impermissibly impinge the First Amendment rights of fund recipients. Pursuant to the long-established unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the government may not restrict a recipient’s speech simply because the government provides him a benefit:

[E]ven though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.

*Perry v. Sindermann*, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); accord *Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr*, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (“[T]he threat of the loss of [a valuable financial benefit] in retaliation for speech may chill speech on matters of public concern . . .”). Conditions attached to government programs may unconstitutionally restrict First Amendment rights even if the program involves Congress’ authority to direct spending under the Spending Clause. See, e.g., *Agency for Int’l Dev.*, 133 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (holding Congress could not restrict appropriations aimed at combating the spread of HIV/AIDS to only organizations that affirmatively opposed prostitution and sex trafficking); *FCC v. League of Women Voters*, 468 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1984) (rejecting the government’s argument that Congress’ spending power justified conditioning funding to public broadcasters on their refraining from editorializing). The constitutional line, while “hardly clear,” rests between “conditions that define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.” *Agency for Int’l Dev.*, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.

The government argues, pursuant to the government subsidy framework articulated in *Agency for Interna-*



*tional Development*, that § 2(a)'s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is simply a reasonable exercise of its spending power, in which the bar on registration is a constitutional condition defining the limits of trademark registration. Our court rejected the applicability of this analysis to trademark registration, 9-3, in our en banc decision in *Tam*.<sup>1</sup> 808 F.3d at 1348-55. The four Justices who reached the issue in *Tam* likewise held the government subsidy framework does not apply to trademark registration. 137 S. Ct. at 1761 (Alito, J.). Justice Alito explained in his plurality opinion that while the constitutional framework articulated in *Agency for International Development* “‘is not always self-evident,’ no difficult question is presented here.” *Id.* (quoting 133 S. Ct. at 2330 (alterations omitted)).

Unlike trademark registration, the programs at issue in the Supreme Court's cases upholding the constitutionality of conditions under the Spending Clause necessarily and directly implicate Congress' power to spend or control government property. For example, *Rust* addressed a condition on the distribution of federal funds for family planning services. 500 U.S. at 177.

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<sup>1</sup> The government maintains that our en banc decision in *Tam* is not binding on this panel in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Tam*. Oral Arg. at 12:23-13:36, 15:43-54. We question the force of this assertion because the Supreme Court did not reverse or otherwise cast doubt on the continuing validity of our government subsidy analysis and other aspects of our decision in *Tam*. See *Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 819 F.3d 1136, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016); *Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co.*, 796 F.3d 160, 166 n.28 (2d Cir. 2015). Because we independently reach the same conclusion as the en banc court, we need not decide whether that holding continues to bind future panel decisions in this circuit.

The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in *United States v. American Library Association, Inc.* upheld a condition on federal funding for Internet access to public libraries. 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003). While *Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington* concerned tax exemptions and deductions, the Supreme Court specified, “[b]oth tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.” 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). “The federal registration of a trademark is nothing like the programs at issue in these cases.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1761 (Alito, J.).

Trademark registration does not implicate Congress’ power to spend funds. An applicant does not receive federal funds upon the PTO’s consideration of, or grant of, a trademark. The only exchange of funds flows from the applicant to the PTO. The applicant pays the applicable trademark process and service fees set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(1), which are then made “available to the Director to carry out the activities of the [PTO].” 35 U.S.C. § 42(c)(1). As explained in our en banc opinion in *Tam*, since 1991, trademark registration fees—not appropriations from taxpayers—have entirely funded the direct operating expenses associated with trademark registration. 808 F.3d at 1353 (citing, e.g., *Figueroa v. United States*, 466 F.3d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Congress’ authority to direct funds is thus not implicated by either the operating expenses necessary to examine a proposed mark or the PTO’s ultimate grant of trademark registration. Of course, trademark registration does not persist entirely independent of federal funds. The government must expend certain federal funds, including but not limited to the cost of PTO employee benefits and costs associated with trademark enforcement, in connection with trademark registra-

tion. *See id.* (citing *Figueroa*, 466 F.3d at 1028). But to the extent government resources are tangentially involved with trademark registration, “just about every government service requires the expenditure of government funds.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1761 (listing, for example, police and fire protection, and copyright and motor vehicle registrations) (Alito, J.); *Tam*, 808 F.3d at 1353 (“Trademark registration does not implicate the Spending Clause merely because of this attenuated spending, else every benefit or regulatory program provided by the government would implicate the Spending Clause.”). The government’s involvement in processing and issuing trademarks does not transform trademark registration into a government subsidy.

Nor is the grant of trademark registration a subsidy equivalent. “Registration is significant. The Lanham Act confers important legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks.” *B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (quotation marks omitted). These benefits are numerous and include the “right to exclusive nationwide use of that mark where there was no prior use by others,” *Tam*, 808 F.3d at 1328, a presumption of validity, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), incontestability in certain situations, *id.* § 1065, the right to sue in federal court, *id.* § 1121, the right to recover treble damages for willful infringement, *id.* § 1117, a complete defense to state or common law claims of trademark dilution, *id.* § 1125(c)(6), the assistance of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in restricting importation of infringing or counterfeit goods, *id.* § 1124; 19 U.S.C. § 1526, the right to prevent “cybersquatters” from misappropriating a domain name, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and qualification for a simplified process for obtaining recognition and pro-

tection of a mark in countries that have signed the Paris Convention, *see id.* § 1141b (Madrid Protocol); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6*quinquies*, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. While these benefits are valuable, they are not analogous to Congress’ grant of federal funds. The benefits of trademark registration arise from the statutory framework of the Lanham Act, and the Lanham Act in turn derives from the Commerce Clause.

Our sister courts confirm that when government registration does not implicate Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause, the government subsidy line of case law does not govern the constitutionality of § 2(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks. *See, e.g., Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n*, 760 F.3d 427, 436 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding a bingo program that was “merely licensed and regulated by the state” was “wholly distinguishable from the subsidies in *Taxation with Representation* and *Rust* simply because no public monies or ‘spending’ by the state are involved”); *Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick*, 847 F.2d 502, 503, 509 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that a treaty under which certain “educational, scientific and cultural audio-visual materials” were granted various benefits, but no federal funds, was “fundamentally different” from government subsidy programs). As the D.C. Circuit noted, “[t]he Supreme Court has never extended the subsidy doctrine to situations not involving financial benefits.” *Autor v. Pritzker*, 740 F.3d 176, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (declining to apply the subsidy doctrine to a presidential directive that impacted committee members who were unpaid).

We can see no reason to treat trademark registration differently.

If the government is correct that a registration program, such as this, gives the government the authority to regulate the content of speech, then every government registration program would provide the government with similar censorship authority. For example, there is no principled basis to distinguish between the registration of trademarks and the registration of copyrights under the government program rationale. The subsidy line of case law cannot justify the government's content-based bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks.

## 2. Trademark Registration is Not a Limited Public Forum

The constitutionality of speech restrictions on government property are analyzed under the Supreme Court's "forum analysis," which "determine[s] when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on speech." *See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez*, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010). The forum analysis is driven by the principle that "the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls." *Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee*, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992); *see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights*, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) ("In much the same way that a newspaper or periodical, or even a radio or television station, need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, a city transit system has discretion to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed in its vehicles.").

The government may not, however, restrict all private speech on its property solely because it is the owner. To determine the constitutional bounds of speech restrictions on government property, the forum analysis instructs us to first classify the government's property as one of three forums.

The first two forums are traditional public forums and designated public forums. Traditional public forums are places such as “streets and parks which have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” *Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n*, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). Designated public forums are created when “government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose.” *Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum*, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). In these forums, “the government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited.” *United States v. Grace*, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). Content-based restrictions on speech “must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited.” *Pleasant Grove*, 555 U.S. at 469 (internal citation omitted).

The remaining forum category is the limited public forum, at times referred to as a non-public forum. Limited public forums are places the government has “limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.” *Id.* at 470. As with traditional and designated public forums, regulations that discriminate based on viewpoint in limited public

forums are presumed unconstitutional. *Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.*, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny and remain constitutional “so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” *Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). Thus, where the government has opened its property for a limited purpose, it can constitutionally restrict speech consistent with that purpose as long as “the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because officials oppose the speaker’s view.” *Perry*, 460 U.S. at 46.

The government argues that the federal trademark registration program is a limited public forum, subjecting § 2(a)’s content-based restriction on marks comprising immoral or scandalous subject matter to a less demanding degree of scrutiny. Gov’t Letter Br. 14-15, *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017). Without articulating why the federal trademark registration program is a limited public forum, the government’s letter brief analogizes trademark registration to city buses and a military cemetery. *Id.* at 14. At oral argument, the government identified the principal register as the limited public forum, which it contended is a metaphysical forum much like the forum at issue in *Rosenberger*. Oral Arg. at 28:40-58.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Apart from the inconsistency of this argument with the government’s previous representation in *Tam*—in which it stated it did not believe the forum analysis applied to trademark registration, and in particular that it did not “regard the register itself as a forum”—this argument fails as a legal matter. See *Tam*, 808 F.3d 1321, Oral Arg. at 1:14:25-1:14:58; *Tam*, 808 F.3d at 1353 n.12.

The Supreme Court has found the existence of a limited public forum only when the government restricts speech on its own property. At one end of that spectrum are venues that are owned and controlled by government entities. See, e.g., *Greer v. Spock*, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (military base); *Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.*, 433 U.S. 119, 134 (1977) (prison facilities); *Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness*, 505 U.S. at 680-83 (Port Authority airport terminal). These cases unquestionably concern "a governmental entity, . . . regulating property in its charge." See *Christian Legal*, 561 U.S. at 669. Other cases involve property that is clearly government owned, although present in public locations. See, e.g., *United States v. Kokinda*, 497 U.S. 720, 727-30 (1990) (sidewalk outside of Postal Service); *Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent*, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (public utility poles). Several of the Court's remaining limited public forum cases involve speech restrictions that occur on public school property. See, e.g., *Christian Legal*, 561 U.S. at 679 n.12 (registered student organization); *Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.*, 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (public school opened for instruction and recreation); *Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.*, 508 U.S. 384, 390-92 (1993) (public school opened for social, civic, and recreational uses); *Perry*, 460 U.S. at 46-47 (public school mail facilities).

While some of the Supreme Court's limited public forum cases have involved forums that exist "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense," these forums have nonetheless been tethered to government properties. See *Rosenberger*, 515 U.S. at 830. In *Rosenberger*, the Supreme Court considered a University's distribution of funds through a Student Activ-



ities Fund (“SAF”) intended to “support a broad range of extracurricular student activities that ‘are related to the educational purpose of the University.’” *Id.* at 824. The Court concluded the SAF was a limited public forum that “effects a sweeping restriction on student thought and student inquiry in the context of University sponsored publications.” *Id.* at 829-30, 836. Although the SAF was “metaphysical”—in that it concerned use of the University’s funds rather than the University’s facilities, *id.* at 830—the effect of its restrictions on speech were felt on the government’s property, the University. *See id.* at 836 (explaining the SAF “risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses”). The forum at issue in *Cornelius* likewise involved a more abstract forum—a charity drive—but that drive was “conducted in the federal workplace during working hours.” 473 U.S. at 790. And while the Supreme Court has applied the forum analysis to broadcasting, it did so in the context of a state-owned broadcaster’s sponsorship of a particular debate at its facilities. *See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes*, 523 U.S. 666, 669, 672 (1998).

Because trademarks are by definition used in commerce, the trademark registration program bears no resemblance to these limited public forums. The speech that flows from trademark registration is not tethered to a public school, federal workplace, or any other government property. A principal feature of trademarks is that they help “consumers identify goods and services that they wish to purchase, as well as those they want to avoid.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. “These marks make up part of the expression of everyday life, as with

the names of entertainment groups, broadcast networks, designer clothing, newspapers, automobiles, candy bars, toys, and so on.” *Id.* at 1768 (Kennedy, J.). By their very purpose, trademarks exist to convey messages throughout commerce. It is difficult to analogize the Nike swoosh or the Nike JUST DO IT mark located on a Nike shirt in a Nike store as somehow a government created limited public forum. The registration and use of registered trademarks simply does not fit within the rubric of public or limited public forum cases. “[T]he forum analysis requires consideration not only of whether government property has been opened to the public, but also of the nature and purpose of the property at issue.” *Preminger*, 517 F.3d 1299 (internal citations omitted); *see also Cornelius*, 473 U.S. at 805 (examining the nature of the government property involved).

A snapshot of marks recently rejected under the immoral or scandalous provision reveals the breadth of goods and services impacted by § 2(a)’s bar on such marks, including speech occurring on clothing, books, websites, beverages, mechanical contraptions, and live entertainment. These refusals chill speech anywhere from the Internet to the grocery store. And none of them involve government property over which the government can assert a right to “legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.” *Lamb’s Chapel*, 508 U.S. at 390.

That registered marks also appear on the government’s principal register does not transform trademark registration into a limited public forum. The government does not open the principal register to any exchange of ideas—it is ancillary to trademark registration. The principal register is simply a database iden-

tifying the marks approved for use in commerce. Oral Arg. at 29:28-41. Apart from its function as a database, the government has been unable to define exactly what the principal register is, or where it is located. *Id.* at 29:34-54. If the government can constitutionally restrain the expression of private speech in commerce because such speech is identified in a government database, so too could the government restrain speech occurring on private land or in connection with privately-owned vehicles, simply because those private properties are listed in a database. *Cf. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 (“For if the registration of trademarks constituted government speech, other systems of government registration could easily be characterized in the same way.”). As the government recognized, such a suppression of speech would raise serious concerns under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. *See* Oral Arg. at 29:56-30:34 (“[T]he key difference there is the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which is the significant constraint on the government’s ability to abuse its power over something like a land registry to influence speech outside a program.”). The government fails to articulate a reason why the government’s listing of registered trademarks in a database creates a limited public forum. And if it did then every government registration program including titles to land, registration of cars, registration of wills or estates, copyrights, even marriage licenses could similarly implicate a limited public forum. We thus conclude that government registration of trademarks does not create a limited public forum in which the government can more freely restrict speech.

3. The Prohibition on the Registration of Immoral or Scandalous Trademarks Targets the Expressive Content of Speech and Therefore Strict Scrutiny Should Be Applied

Commercial speech is speech which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” *Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citation omitted). Trademarks certainly convey a commercial message, but not exclusively so. There is no doubt that trademarks “identify the source of a product or service, and therefore play a role in the ‘dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.’” *Tam*, 808 F.3d at 1338 (quoting *Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy*, 425 U.S. at 765). However, trademarks—including immoral or scandalous trademarks—also “often have an expressive content.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. For immoral or scandalous marks, this message is often uncouth. But it can espouse a powerful cause. *See, e.g.*, FUCK HEROIN, Appl. No. 86,361,326; FUCK CANCER, Appl. No. 86,290,011; FUCK RACISM, Appl. No. 85,608,559. It can put forth a political view, *see* DEMOCRAT.BS, Appl. No. 77,042,069, or REPUBLICAN.BS, Appl. No. 77,042,071. While the speech expressed in trademarks is brief, “powerful messages can sometimes be conveyed in just a few words.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1760.

The test used by the PTO to prohibit immoral or scandalous marks is whether a “substantial composite

of the general public”<sup>3</sup> would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . or calling out for condemnation.” *Fox*, 702 F.3d at 665. There can be no question that the immoral or scandalous prohibition targets the expressive components of the speech. As in this case, the agency often justifies its rejection of marks on the grounds that they convey offensive ideas. J.A. 8-9 (explaining that Mr. Brunetti’s use of his trademark is scandalous because his mark “objectifies women and offers degrading examples of extreme misogyny” and contains a theme “of extreme nihilism” with “anti-social imagery” and is “lacking in taste”). These are each value judgments about the expressive message behind the trademark. Whether marks comprise immoral or scandalous subject matter hinges on the expressive, not source-identifying, nature of trademarks.

While different provisions of the Lanham Act may appropriately be classified as targeting a mark’s source-identifying information—for example, § 2(e)’s bar on registering marks that are “merely descriptive” or “geographically descriptive”—the immoral or scandalous provision targets a mark’s expressive message, which is separate and distinct from the commercial purpose of a mark as a source identifier. Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence: “The central purpose of trademark registration is to facilitate source identification. . . . Whether a mark is disparaging bears no plausible relation to that goal.” 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J.).

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<sup>3</sup> The PTO justifies its refusals by “tying censorship to the reaction of the speaker’s audience.” See *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J.).

We find the same logic applies to the immoral or scandalous prohibition. As in the case of disparaging marks, the PTO's rejections under § 2(a)'s bar on immoral or scandalous marks are necessarily based in the government's belief that the rejected mark conveys an expressive message—namely, a message that is scandalous or offensive to a substantial composite of the general population. See *Tam*, 808 F.3d at 1338. Section 2(a) regulates the expressive components of speech, not the commercial components of speech, and as such it should be subject to strict scrutiny. See *Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.*, 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011). There is no dispute that § 2(a)'s bar on the registration of immoral or scandalous marks is unconstitutional if strict scrutiny applies.

#### 4. Section 2(a)'s Bar on Immoral or Scandalous Marks Does Not Survive Intermediate Scrutiny

Section 2(a)'s bar on the registration of immoral or scandalous marks is unconstitutional even if treated as a regulation of purely commercial speech reviewed according to the intermediate scrutiny framework established in *Central Hudson*, 447 U.S. at 566. Intermediate scrutiny requires that “the State must show at least that the statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.” *Sorrell*, 564 U.S. at 572.

Commercial speech is subject to a four-part test which asks whether (1) the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances that government interest; and (4) whether the regulation is “not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.” *Central Hudson*, 447 U.S. at 566; see also *Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox*,

492 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989) (explaining the fourth prong of *Central Hudson* requires “not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective”). “Under a commercial speech inquiry, it is the State’s burden to justify its content-based law as consistent with the First Amendment.” *Sorrell*, 564 U.S. at 565.

The immoral or scandalous provision clearly meets the first prong of the *Central Hudson* test, which requires we first confirm the speech “concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” 447 U.S. at 566. Section 2(a)’s provision barring immoral or scandalous marks, like the disparagement provision, does not address misleading, deceptive, or unlawful marks. Rather it is concerned with whether a mark is offensive, scandalous, or vulgar to a substantial composite of the general public.

*Central Hudson*’s second prong, requiring a substantial government interest, is not met. The only government interest related to the immoral or scandalous provision that we can discern from the government’s briefing is its interest in “protecting public order and morality.” Gov’t Letter Br. 15 & n.6, *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017).<sup>4</sup> At oral argument, the government struggled to identify the substantial interest in barring registration of trademarks comprising immoral or scandalous subject mat-

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<sup>4</sup> The government’s brief also made an errant reference to its interest “in the orderly flow of commerce.” Gov’t Letter Br. 15, *In re Brunetti*, No. 15-1109, Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017). While we do not question the substantiality of this interest, the government has failed to articulate how this interest is in any way advanced by the immoral or scandalous prohibition, or how that provision is narrowly tailored to that interest.

ter. The government framed its interest based on the government’s own perception of proposed marks, including what types of marks the government would “want to promote” or “has deemed to be most suitable.” Oral Arg. at 22:35-41, 22:56-23:00. At another point, the government indicated its interest is to shield its examiners from immoral or scandalous marks: “whether or not its examiners are forced to decide whether one drawing of genitalia is confusingly similar to another drawing of genitalia.” *Id.* at 21:51-22:12. Ultimately, the government stated, “Congress’ primary interest is the promotion of the use of non-scandalous marks in commerce.” *Id.* at 23:33-42; *see also id.* at 25:21-32 (“Promoting commerce that doesn’t include the use of source identifiers that are graphic sexual images or profanities that are going to be off-putting to a substantial composite of the public.”). Whichever articulation of the government’s interest we choose, the government has failed to identify a substantial interest justifying its suppression of immoral or scandalous trademarks.<sup>5</sup>

First, the government does not have a substantial interest in promoting certain trademarks over others. The Supreme Court rejected the government’s claim that trademarks are government speech. *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1757-61. Our conclusion that trademark registration

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<sup>5</sup> We note that the government hardly met its burden to identify a government interest at all. To identify this purported interest, the government has done no more than “taken the *effect* of the statute and posited that effect as the State’s interest. If accepted, this sort of circular defense can sidestep judicial review of almost any statute, because it makes all statutes look narrowly tailored.” *Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.*, 502 U.S. 105, 120 (1991).



is neither a government subsidy nor a limited public forum forecloses any remaining interest the government may have in approving only marks it “has deemed to be most suitable.” Oral Arg. at 22:56-23:00; *see also Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1760-63 (plurality rejecting the government subsidy argument) (Alito, J.).

Second, Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the government’s general interest in protecting the public from marks it deems “off-putting,” whether to protect the general public or the government itself, is not a substantial interest justifying broad suppression of speech. “[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.” *Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell*, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); *Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.*, 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (“At least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression.” (citation omitted)); *Cohen v. California*, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense.”); *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 551 (“[C]onstitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise.”). “Where the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists.” *Playboy*, 529 U.S. at 813.

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Tam* supports our conclusion that the government’s interest in protecting the public from off-putting marks is an inadequate government interest for First Amendment purposes. *See*,

*e.g.*, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (applying *Central Hudson* and rejecting the government’s “interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend” because “that idea strikes at the heart of the First Amendment”) (Alito, J.). In *Tam*, the Court acknowledged that it is a “bedrock First Amendment principle” that “Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” *Tam*, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (Alito, J.); *see also id.* at 1767 (“[T]he Court’s cases have long prohibited the government from justifying a First Amendment burden by pointing to the offensiveness of the speech to be suppressed.”) (Kennedy, J.). Both Justice Alito’s and Justice Kennedy’s opinions support their conclusions that the disparagement provision is unconstitutional citing cases holding “the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” *Id.* at 1763 (collecting cases) (quoting *Street v. New York*, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)) (Alito, J.); *id.* at 1767 (citing Justice Alito’s opinion at 1763-64) (Kennedy, J.); *see also Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); *Coates v. Cincinnati*, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (“[M]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional freedoms.”). The government’s interest in suppressing speech because it is off-putting is unavailing.

While the government’s interest in *Tam* related to a viewpoint-based restriction on speech, we note the cases on which the Supreme Court relied are not so limited. The cases cited in *Tam* are directed to speech

that may be offensive, but not all involve speech that is disparaging or viewpoint discriminatory. Many involve speech that, rather than disparaging others, involved peaceful demonstrations. See, e.g., *Bachellar v. Maryland*, 397 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1970) (peaceful Vietnam war protest carrying signs such as “Make Love not War”); *Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.*, 393 U.S. 503, 509-14 (1969) (wearing black armbands to protest Vietnam war); *Cox v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 536, 545, 550-51 (1965) (protesting segregation and discrimination); *De Jonge v. Oregon*, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (peaceful political meeting). Several other cases do not appear to involve viewpoint discrimination at all. For example, *Hustler Magazine* concerned a parody interview of Jerry Falwell in which the actor playing him stated his “‘first time’ was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.” 485 U.S. at 48. While such a parody interview is offensive, its function as a parody does not clearly involve the expression of beliefs, ideas, or perspectives. Similarly, the ordinance at issue in *Coates* was not limited to restricting disparaging speech or certain viewpoints, but prohibited any conduct perceived as “annoying to persons passing by.” 402 U.S. at 611. The Supreme Court’s narrative that the government cannot justify restricting speech because it offends, together with its reliance on cases involving a variety of different speech restrictions, reinforce our conclusion that the government’s interest in protecting the public from off-putting marks is not substantial.

Finally, the government does not have a substantial interest in protecting the public from scandalousness and profanities. The government attempts to justify this interest by pointing to the Supreme Court’s deci-

sion in *FCC v. Pacifica Foundation*, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In *Pacifica*, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's declaratory order determining that an afternoon radio broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue was indecent and potentially sanctionable. *Id.* at 730-32. The Court explained "references to excretory and sexual material . . . surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern." *Id.* at 742. The Court justified the FCC's order, however, because radio broadcasting has "a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read," confronting Americans "in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." *Id.* at 749. The Court stressed: "It is appropriate to emphasize the narrowness of our holding." *Id.* at 750. Subsequent precedent explained that other mediums of communication, such as dial-in-services or the Internet, are "manifestly different from a situation in which a listener does not want the received message." *Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC*, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) ("Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it."); *Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union*, 521 U.S. 844, 868-69 (1997) (explaining *Pacifica* does not control because "the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio or television").

The government's interest in protecting the public from profane and scandalous marks is not akin to the government's interest in protecting children and other unsuspecting listeners from a barrage of swear words over the radio in *Pacifica*. A trademark is not foisted

upon listeners by virtue of its being registered. Nor does registration make a scandalous mark more accessible to children. Absent any concerns that trademark registration invades a substantial privacy interest in an intolerable manner, the government's interest amounts to protecting everyone, including adults, from scandalous content. But even when "many adults themselves would find the material highly offensive," adults have a First Amendment right to view and hear speech that is profane and scandalous. *Playboy*, 529 U.S. at 811 (First Amendment right to view "sexually explicit adult programming or other programming that is indecent"); *Sable*, 492 U.S. at 115 ("Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment."). In crafting a substantial government interest, "the government may not 'reduce the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.'" *Bolger*, 463 U.S. at 73 (citation omitted); *cf. Sable*, 492 U.S. at 131 ("[T]he statute's denial of adult access to telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages . . .").

Even if we were to hold that the government has a substantial interest in protecting the public from scandalous or immoral marks, the government could not meet the third prong of *Central Hudson*, which requires the regulation directly advance the government's asserted interest. 447 U.S. at 566. As the government has repeatedly exhorted, § 2(a) does not directly prevent applicants from using their marks. Regardless of whether a trademark is federally registered, an applicant can still brand clothing with his mark, advertise with it on the television or radio, or place it on billboards along the highway. In this electronic/Internet

age, to the extent that the government seeks to protect the general population from scandalous material, with all due respect, it has completely failed.

Finally, no matter the government's interest, it cannot meet the fourth prong of *Central Hudson*. The PTO's inconsistent application of the immoral or scandalous provision creates an "uncertainty [that] undermines the likelihood that the [provision] has been carefully tailored." *See Reno*, 521 U.S. at 871. Nearly identical marks have been approved by one examining attorney and rejected as scandalous or immoral by another. The PTO registered the mark FUGLY for use on clothing, but refused registration for use on alcoholic beverages. *Compare* Reg. No. 5,135,615, *with* Appl. No. 78,866,347. *See also* COCAINE, Appl. No. 78,829,207 (rejected), COCAINE, Reg. No. 1,340,874 (accepted). The PTO registered NO BS! BRASS, Reg. No. 5,053,827, for entertainment services but rejected NO BS ZONE, Appl. No. 76,626,390, for internet training. NO \$#!+, Appl. No. 85,855,449, was rejected, but \$#\*! MY DAD SAYS, Reg. No. 4,142,745, was allowed. *See also* ROLL TURD, Appl. No. 86,448,988 (rejected), TURD HERDERS, Reg. No. 5,180,286 (registered). Although the language in these marks is offensive, we cannot discern any pattern indicating when the incorporation of an offensive term into a mark will serve as a bar to registration and when it will not.

One commentator has written that, of the forty marks containing the acronym MILF for which written records were available as of 2011, twenty marks received an office action refusing registration based on § 2(a), while twenty did not. Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, *Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be*

*Scandalous or Immoral*, 101 Trademark Rep. 1476, 1478-82 (2011). It is difficult to understand what distinguished the refused marks, which included GOT MILF (clothing), MILF MANIA (adult online services), MILF SEEKER (adult entertainment services), and FROM SOCCER MOM TO MILF (self-help books for women), from the marks which were registered, including DIARY OF A MILF (adult online services), BACKROOM MILF (adult online services), FAT MILF (sandwich), and MILF NEXT DOOR (adult online services). *Id.* Another empirical study identified words that served as the basis of a § 2(a) refusal in some marks but were material components of other marks approved by the PTO. The authors found that to the extent there are general trends in the PTO's treatment of the offensive terms, "those general trends are apparently inconsistent with one another." Meghan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, *NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandalous Trademarks*, 33 *Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.* 321, 356-61 (2015). Even marks that reference the indisputably vulgar term "fuck," like the mark at issue here, are not always rejected as a matter of course. The PTO registered the mark FCUK, but rejected the marks FUCT and F\*\*K PROJECT as scandalous. It allowed the registration of MUTHA EFFIN BINGO, Reg. No. 4,183,272, and IF WE TOUCH IT, IT'S FN GOLDEN, Reg. No. 4,100,978, but not F ALL F'S APPAREL FOR THE F'N ANGRY, Appl. No. 78,420,315.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The PTO's inconsistent rejections under the immoral or scandalous provision also raise concerns about the provision's vagueness. *See Tam*, 808 F.3d at 1359 (O'Malley, J., concurring) (opining that § 2(a)'s bar on disparaging marks was unconstitutionally vague

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has itself noted the vague and subjective nature of the scandalous inquiry. *In re In Over Our Heads, Inc.*, 1990 WL 354546 at \*1 (“[T]he guidelines for determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are somewhat vague and the determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is necessarily a highly subjective one.”). It can no doubt be a difficult task to determine public perceptions of a trademark’s morality or immorality, offensiveness, or even vulgarity. As the Supreme Court has explained, “it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.” *Cohen*, 403 U.S. at 25. To be sure, there are other trademark’s whose offensiveness cannot be reasonably questioned; the government attached an appendix with examples of such marks which it has rejected to this court. But the subjectivity in the determination of what is immoral or scandalous and the disparate and unpredictable application of these principles cause us to conclude that the prohibition at issue in this case would also fail the fourth prong of the *Central Hudson* analysis.

We conclude that the government has not presented us with a substantial government interest justifying the § 2(a) bar on immoral or scandalous marks. As we concluded in *Tam*, “All of the government’s proffered interests boil down to permitting the government to burden speech it finds offensive.” *Tam*, 808 F.3d at

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and identifying examples “where there is no conceivable difference between the applied-for marks, yet one is approved and the other rejected”). We need not reach whether the immoral or scandalous provision is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment.



1357. We also conclude that the government has failed to demonstrate that its restriction will advance the interests it asserts and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that objective. Section 2(a)'s bar on immoral or scandalous marks does not survive intermediate scrutiny under *Central Hudson*.

5. There Is No Reasonable Definition of the Statutory Terms Scandalous and Immoral Which Would Preserve Their Constitutionality

We construe statutes narrowly to preserve their constitutionality, when possible. See *Schneider v. Smith*, 390 U.S. 17, 26 (1968). However, “[t]he infringement of First Amendment rights will not be cured if the narrowing construction is so unforeseeable that men of common intelligence could not have realized the law’s limited scope at the only relevant time, when their acts were committed, or if the law remains excessively sweeping even as narrowed.” *Gregory v. City of Chi.*, 394 U.S. 111, 121 (1969) (citations omitted). Our duty to avoid constitutional questions “is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature. Any other conclusion, while purporting to be an exercise in judicial restraint, would trench upon the legislative powers vested in Congress.” *United States v. Albertini*, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985) (citations omitted). It is thus permissible to construe a statute in a manner that preserves its constitutionality only where the construction is reasonable.

The concurrence agrees that the scandalous and immoral prohibitions as construed by the government, this court, and our predecessor court are unconstitutional. This court and its predecessor have consistently defined “scandalous” as “shocking to the sense of truth,

decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; or calling out for condemnation.” *Fox*, 702 F.3d at 635; *accord McGinley*, 660 F.2d at 485; *Riverbank Canning Co.*, 95 F.3d at 328. The concurrence proposes that we “narrow the immoral-scandalous provision’s scope to obscene marks in order to preserve its constitutionality.” Conc. Op. 5-6. While the legislature could rewrite the statute to adopt such a standard, we cannot.

It is not reasonable to construe the words immoral and scandalous as confined to obscene material. There is no dispute that an obscene mark would be scandalous or immoral; however, not all scandalous or immoral marks are obscene. All apples are fruit, but not all fruits are apples. As the PTO has explained, “the threshold for objectionable matter is lower for what can be described as ‘scandalous’ than for ‘obscene.’” J.A. 4 (citation omitted); *accord McGinley*, 660 F.2d at 487 n.9. The PTO has for a century rejected marks as scandalous or immoral that are clearly not obscene. As set forth above, many of the early cases applying the immoral or scandalous provision involved blasphemous marks touching on religion, which were not obscene.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> With no authority, the concurrence suggests “the central aim of the immoral-scandalous provision . . . has been sexual material.” Conc. Op. 6-7. To the contrary, there is a long history of rejecting numerous categories of non-sexual material under this provision. *See generally* LaLonde & Gilson, *supra*, at 1510-14, 1517-33 (discussing the application of the provision to marks related to religion, drug references, violence, disparaging patriotic symbols, mild profanity, and scatological references). Moreover, the concurrence suggests narrowing the immoral or scandalous provision to obscene material would be consistent with PTO action. The marks cited by the concurrence, like the FUCT mark at issue in this case, would not

The Supreme Court has made clear that the definition of obscenity for purposes of the First Amendment is “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest,” *i.e.*, “material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.” *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 487 & n.20 (1957). This “definition does not reflect the precise meaning of ‘obscene’ as traditionally used in the English language,” and instead is limited to “obscene material ‘*which deals with sex.*’” *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (emphasis added).

Despite the concurrence’s suggestion to the contrary, none of the dictionary definitions cited define “immoral” or “scandalous” in sexual terms.<sup>8</sup> *Immoral, Black’s Law Dictionary* (1st ed. 1891) (“Contrary to good morals; inconsistent with the rules and principles of morality which regard men as living in a community, and which are necessary for the public welfare, order, and decency.”); *Immoral, Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (1898) (“Not moral; inconsistent with good morals; contrary to conscience or the divine law.”); *Scandalous, Id.* (“1. Giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings. 2. Disgraceful to reputation; opprobrious. 3. Defamatory; libelous.”); *Immoral, Webster’s Complete Dictionary* (1886) (“Not moral; inconsistent rectitude; contrary

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be properly refused under a prohibition limited to obscenity. *See* Conc. Op. 7 n.7.

<sup>8</sup> The concurrence’s reliance on overlapping dictionary definitions of “immoral,” “scandalous,” and “obscene” ignores this important limitation. The question before us is not whether the obscene material is “immoral” and “scandalous,” but rather whether Congress intended the terms “immoral” or “scandalous” to be confined to material that is “obscene” for the purposes of a First Amendment analysis.

to conscience or the divine law; wicked; unjust; dishonest; vicious”); *Scandalous, Id.* (“1. Giving offense; exciting reprobation; calling out condemnation; extremely offensive to duty or propriety” “2. Disgraceful to reputation; bringing shame or infamy; opprobrious” “3. Defamatory; libelous”).

Unlike the terms “immoral” and “scandalous,” the statutory terms at issue in the cases cited in the concurrence are by their nature limited to material “which deals with sex.” *See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.*, 472 U.S. 491, 494 (1985) (construing phrase “that which incites lasciviousness or lust”); *Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day*, 370 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (“While in common usage the words have different shades of meaning, the statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex.” (footnote omitted)); *Swearingen v. United States*, 161 U.S. 446, 451 (1896) (“The words ‘obscene,’ ‘lewd,’ and ‘lascivious,’ as used in the statute, signify that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity . . . .”). We do not see how the words “immoral” and “scandalous” could reasonably be read to be limited to material of a sexual nature. We cannot stand in the shoes of the legislature and rewrite a statute.

#### CONCLUSION

The trademark at issue is vulgar. And the government included an appendix in its briefing to the court which contains numerous highly offensive, even shocking, images and words for which individuals have sought trademark registration. Many of the marks rejected under § 2(a)’s bar on immoral or scandalous marks, including the marks discussed in this opinion,

are lewd, crass, or even disturbing. We find the use of such marks in commerce discomfoting, and are not eager to see a proliferation of such marks in the marketplace. There are, however, a cadre of similarly offensive images and words that have secured copyright registration by the government. There are countless songs with vulgar lyrics, blasphemous images, scandalous books and paintings, all of which are protected under federal law. No doubt many works registered with the Copyright Office offend a substantial composite of the general public. There are words and images that we do not wish to be confronted with, not as art, nor in the marketplace. The First Amendment, however, protects private expression, even private expression which is offensive to a substantial composite of the general public. The government has offered no substantial government interest for policing offensive speech in the context of a registration program such as the one at issue in this case.

We hold that the bar in § 2(a) against immoral or scandalous marks is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment. We reverse the Board's holding that Mr. Brunetti's mark is unregistrable under § 2(a).

**REVERSED**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

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No. 2015-1109

IN RE: ERIK BRUNETTI, APPELLANT

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Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark  
Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in  
No. 85310960.

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DYK, *Circuit Judge*, concurring in the judgment.

The majority today strikes down as unconstitutional a century-old provision of the Lanham Act that prohibits the registration of “immoral . . . or scandalous” marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). In doing so, it notes our obligation to “construe statutes narrowly to preserve their constitutionality, when possible.” Maj. Op. 38. It concludes, however, that there is no such reasonable narrow construction. *Id.* at 38-41. I think that such a saving construction is possible and that we are obligated to adopt it.

As an initial matter, I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Matal v. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), does not dictate the facial invalidity of the immoral-scandalous provision. *Tam* held only that the disparagement provision of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional because it was not viewpoint neutral; it did not address the immoral-scandalous provision at issue here. *See id.* at 1763-65 (plurality op.); *id.* at 1765-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). So too did the opinions

reserve judgment as to the other Lanham Act provisions. *Id.* at 1763 n.16 (plurality op.) (“We leave open the question whether this is the appropriate framework for analyzing free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act.”); *id.* at 1768 (Kennedy, J.) (“This case does not present the question of how other provisions of the Lanham Act should be analyzed under the First Amendment.”). Nonetheless, I also agree that the immoral-scandalous provision raises some serious First Amendment questions, as the majority opinion concludes. *See* Maj. Op. 28-38.<sup>1</sup>

I think that we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid these constitutional questions. Courts must, “where possible, construe federal statutes so as ‘to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality.’” *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 477 (2011) (quoting *Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor*, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)). A saving construction of a statute need only be “fairly possible,” and “every reasonable construction must be resorted to.” *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 567 U.S. 519, 563 (2012) (first quoting *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); then quoting *Hooper v. California*, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).

One such fairly possible reading is available to us here by limiting the clause’s reach to obscene marks, which are not protected by the First Amendment. Where the regulation of speech is concerned, the Supreme Court has a long history of narrowing the scope

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<sup>1</sup> The majority states that I “agree[] that the scandalous and immoral prohibitions . . . are unconstitutional.” *Id.* at 38. As discussed more fully below, following the Supreme Court’s instructions, I would adopt a narrowing construction specifically in order to avoid these difficult constitutional questions.

of similarly worded statutes to cover only obscene speech. The most prominent examples are the federal obscenity statutes. In 1896, the Supreme Court considered an early version of these laws, which criminalized the mailing of “obscene, lewd or lascivious” materials. *Swearingen v. United States*, 161 U.S. 446, 450 (1896). While acknowledging that “it might be inferred that each of those epithets pointed out a distinct offense”—the familiar canon against superfluities—the Court nevertheless construed the statute narrowly to “describ[e] one and the same offense,” namely, the mailing of obscene materials. *Id.*

The obscenity statutes were later amended to include an even broader description of the targeted matter. Today, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 criminalizes the mailing of any “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article,” and § 1462 criminalizes the importation of “obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy” materials. Nonetheless, in a series of opinions in the 1960s and ’70s, the Supreme Court construed this broader language narrowly to apply only to obscenity in order to avoid constitutional doubts. *See Hamling v. United States*, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974) (limiting § 1461 to obscenity to avoid a vagueness challenge); *United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film*, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30, 130 n.7 (1973) (same with respect to § 1462); *Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day*, 370 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1962) (plurality op.) (footnote omitted) (“While in common usage the words have different shades of meaning, the statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex.”). The Supreme Court took a similar approach when rejecting an overbreadth challenge to a Washington statute that defined “prurient” as “that which incites lasciviousness or lust,” *Brockett*



*v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.*, 472 U.S. 491, 494 (1985), construing the statute’s reference to lust to reach only obscenity, *id.* at 504-05.<sup>2</sup>

As the Supreme Court has done with the obscenity statutes, here when faced with constitutional doubt as to the immoral-scandalous provision, we should adopt a narrowing construction and limit the statute to obscenity.<sup>3</sup> As in the earlier Supreme Court cases, there is no question that the trademark statute bars registration of obscene marks. While the statute does not use the word “obscene” to define its scope, the absence of the word in my view makes a narrowing construction easier rather than more difficult, since it suggests that the drafters did not use the word “obscene” to differentiate “immoral” and “scandalous” material from obscenity.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> I am aware of only one case in which the Supreme Court declined to construe similar language as limited to obscenity. *FCC v. Pacifica Foundation*, 438 U.S. 726, 738-41, 741 n.17 (1978), having arisen in the broadcasting context, is quite different from the present situation.

<sup>3</sup> Of course, if this were a state rather than federal statute, the different standard for narrowing constructions might dictate a different result. See, e.g., *Conchatta Inc. v. Miller*, 458 F.3d 258, 263-65 (3d Cir. 2006).

<sup>4</sup> Our predecessor court noted that “the threshold for objectionable matter is lower for what can be described as ‘scandalous’ than for ‘obscene,’” which suggests that any marks meeting the threshold for obscenity would also be considered scandalous. *In re McGinley*, 660 F.2d 481, 485 n.9 (CCPA 1981), *overruled on other grounds by In re Tam*, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), *aff’d*, 137 S. Ct. 1744. To the extent that *McGinley* supports a construction of the immoral-scandalous provision that is broader than just obscenity, we are not bound by that construction given the constitutional doubts raised in this case and the intervening changes in the case law since that 1981 decision, including *Tam*.

And the fact that the immoral-scandalous provision may appear to be broader than obscenity does not preclude our adopting a narrowing construction of the statute. Contemporary dictionaries from the period before the 1905 enactment of the provision suggest that “immoral” and “scandalous” were understood as equivalent to “obscene.” For example, “obscene” was itself listed as a synonym for “immoral.”<sup>5</sup>

Under these circumstances, we can appropriately narrow the immoral-scandalous provision’s scope to obscene marks in order to preserve its constitutionality, and we are obligated to do so.<sup>6</sup>

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*See, e.g., Troy v. Samson Mfg. Corp.*, 758 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

<sup>5</sup> *Immoral*, *Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (1898); *Immoral*, *Webster’s Complete Dictionary* (1886). In addition, all three words were defined in terms of giving offense to morals, and “obscene” and “immoral” were specifically defined in opposition to chastity. *Immoral*, *Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (“inconsistent with good morals,” “unchaste”); *Obscene*, *id.* (“[o]ffensive to chastity”); *Scandalous*, *id.* (“[g]iving offense to the conscience or moral feelings”); *Immoral*, *Black’s Law Dictionary* (1st ed. 1891) (“[c]ontrary to good morals”); *Obscene*, *id.* (“calculated to shock the moral sense of man by a disregard of chastity or modesty”); *Immoral*, *Webster’s Complete Dictionary* (“[n]ot moral,” “unchaste”); *Obscene*, *id.* (“[o]ffensive to chastity and delicacy”); *Scandalous*, *id.* (“[g]iving offense”). Finally, “immoral” and “obscene” shared a number of other synonyms, including “lewd,” “impure,” and “indecent.” *Immoral*, *Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (“impure,” “lewd”); *Obscene*, *id.* (“indecent; impure; lewd”); *Immoral*, *Webster’s Complete Dictionary* (“impure,” “lewd”); *Obscene*, *id.* (“[i]mpure,” “indecent,” “lewd”); *Obscene*, *Black’s Law Dictionary* (“[l]ewd; impure; indecent”).

<sup>6</sup> We are under this obligation notwithstanding the fact that the government has not advocated for such a narrowing construction. For example, in *Spokane Arcades*, the Supreme Court adopted a

The majority recognizes that we have an obligation to construe statutes to preserve their constitutionality. Maj. Op. 38. But the majority provides no plausible reason for failure to narrowly construe the language in § 1052(a) to avoid the evident problems created by a broader construction. To be sure, as the majority points out, the words “immoral” and “scandalous” could have a broader meaning than “obscenity,” a broader meaning fraught with constitutional problems. But the potential breadth of the language is hardly a reason to reject a narrowing construction; rather, it is the very reason that a narrowing construction is appropriate. And the majority offers no convincing basis for distinguishing this case from the Supreme Court cases, discussed above, narrowing the construction of very similar language to obscenity. The majority appears to suggest that in those Supreme Court cases, the statutory concern with sexual representations was evident but that here that connection is absent. In fact, the central aim of the immoral-scandalous provision in this court’s cases has been sexual material reflected in trademarks.<sup>7</sup> So too, the vast majority of PTO rejec-

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narrowing construction despite the state officials’ arguments that the statute was facially constitutional and not in need of narrowing. 472 U.S. at 501-05; *see also SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot.*, 556 F.3d 1337, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he government’s arguments [against a saving construction] cannot relieve us of our obligation to construe the Byrd Amendment to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality.”).

<sup>7</sup> *See In re Fox*, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming refusal to register COCK SUCKER mark for lollipops); *McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent*, 240 F. App’x 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (finding no standing to oppose registration of DYKE mark); *In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming refusal to register JACK-OFF marks); *In re Mavety*

tions under the immoral-scandalous provision in recent decades have related to sex.<sup>8</sup> The existence of isolated decisions viewing the provision as having a secondary concern with non-sexual marks<sup>9</sup> cannot make a narrowing construction inappropriate. Interestingly, the scholarly analysis of the scandalous-immoral provision relied on by the majority has suggested that an amendment to the statute narrowing its scope to obscene marks would preserve the core of the provision.<sup>10</sup>

\* \* \*

The First Amendment does not protect obscene speech. *E.g.*, *United States v. Williams*, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008). Under the narrow construction I have proposed, then, the bar on the registration of obscene marks would withstand constitutional challenge. If Congress wished to expand the scope of § 1052(a), it could enact

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*Media Grp. Ltd.*, 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (vacating refusal to register BLACK TAIL mark); *McGinley*, 660 F.2d 481 (affirming refusal to register mark depicting genitalia).

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, *Trademarks Laid Bare*, 101 Trademark Rep. 1476, 1510-33 (2011), in which the examples of recent rejections are predominantly sexual references.

<sup>9</sup> See, *e.g.*, *In re Riverbank Canning Co.*, 95 F.2d 327 (CCPA 1938) (affirming refusal to register MADONNA mark for wine). Although LaLonde and Gilson provide other historical examples of prior rejections for religious references, LaLonde & Gilson, *supra*, at 1510-13, they also explain that the PTO has since directed that rejections based on offense to religion should be grounded in the (now-invalidated) disparagement provision rather than the scandalous-immoral provision, *see id.* at 1511.

<sup>10</sup> See *id.* at 1534 (noting that narrowing “immoral” and “scandalous” to “obscene” would ensure that the provision no longer applies to marks “at the edges of scandalousness”).

new legislation, which could then be constitutionally tested. Without this saving construction, the majority's result leaves the government with no authority to prevent the registration of even the most patently obscene marks.

Because there is no suggestion that Mr. Brunetti's mark is obscene, however, I agree that the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board must be reversed. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.

**APPENDIX B**

UNITED STATES PATENT AND  
TRADEMARK OFFICE  
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

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Serial No. 85310960

IN RE BRUNETTI<sup>1</sup>

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Mailed: Aug. 1, 2014

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Before: Bucher, Wellington and Wolfson, Administrative  
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Bucher, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Erik Brunetti (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the term **fuct** (*in standard character format*) for “athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps; children’s and infant’s apparel, namely, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas,

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<sup>1</sup> This application was originally filed by joint applicants, David Gollup and Christopher MacLachlan, of Cary, NC, on May 3, 2011. On May 12, 2012, joint applicants (Messrs. Gollop and MacLachlan) assigned their entire interest in the ITU application for the term **fuct** to Erik Brunetti of Los Angeles, California, which assignment document was received by the Assignment Branch of the United States Patent and Trademark Office on May 14, 2012. The Assignors allegedly assigned, transferred and conveyed “. . . all right, title and interest in and to the trademark **fuct** along with all goodwill associated therewith and that portion of the business of assignor’s business to which the trademark pertains . . . .” See Section 10 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1060; 37 C.F.R. § 3.16; and TMEP § 501.01(a).

rompers and one-piece garments” in International Class 25.<sup>2</sup>

The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark under Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), because the applied-for mark comprises immoral or scandalous matter.

According to the Trademark Examining Attorney, the term “Fuct” is the phonetic equivalent of the word “Fucked,” the past tense form of the verb “fuck.” For this reason, the Office maintains this term is “vulgar, profane and scandalous slang.” Applicant, on the other hand, contends that: with the Trademark Examining Attorney’s focus on the alleged “vulgar” nature of this term, the Office has employed an incorrect standard in refusing registration under Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act; that the evidence of record is not sufficient to prove that the term “Fuct” is “so scandalous” as to justify the refusal to register; that the applied-for mark, **fuct** is a coined word that has no meaning other than as Applicant’s brand name; and finally, that the Board should narrow the scope of the statutory bar under “scandalous and immoral” in light of evolving First Amendment jurisprudence and the opinions of respected legal commentators that this provision of the Trademark Act, as currently enforced by the Office, is simply unconstitutional.

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<sup>2</sup> Application Serial No. 85310960 was filed on May 3, 2011, based upon Applicant’s allegation of a *bona fide* intention to use the term in commerce under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act. On May 18, 2012, Mr. Brunetti filed an Amendment to Allege Use (AAU) claiming first use anywhere and use in commerce, through his predecessors-in-interest, since at least as early as December 31, 1991.

When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. After the Trademark Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. As explained below, we agree with the Trademark Examining Attorney, and affirm the refusal to register.

### **I. Preliminary matter**

The Trademark Examining Attorney has objected to “Exhibit A” and arguments related to that exhibit, which Applicant submitted for the first time with its appeal brief. Under our Trademark Rules, the record in an application should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal. 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d). Inasmuch as this new evidence and arguments were submitted in an untimely manner, we have not considered these tardy submissions. See *In re Luxuria s.r.o.*, 100 USPQ2d 1146, 1147-48 (TTAB 2011); *In re Giovanni Food Co.*, 97 USPQ2d 1990, 1990-91 (TTAB 2011); *In re Van Valkenburgh*, 97 USPQ2d 1757, 1768 n.32, 1769 (TTAB 2011); and TBMP §§ 1203.02(e), 1207.01 (2014).

### **II. Brunetti’s “Streetwear”**

Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur whose graphics are infused with cultural strands from skateboarding, graffiti culture, punk rock music, and remnants of Situationist Ideal ideologies. He has been a trailblazer since the early nineties in popularizing “streetwear” having revolutionary themes, proudly subversive graphics and in-your-face imagery. His assaults on American culture critique capitalism, government, religion and pop culture. Brunetti’s blog is directed to a cult following that he, his company, Fuct Manuf. Co., and Fuct’s “Same Shit Different Day” line of clothing



have developed since he allegedly first adopted this designation in 1991.

### **III. Legal standard for determining whether a term is scandalous**

The determination of whether a term is scandalous is a conclusion of law based on the underlying facts. *See, e.g., In re Fox*, 702 F.3d 633, 105 USPQ2d 1247, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has the burden of proving that a trademark falls within the prohibition of Section 2(a). *Id.* To prove that the term **fu**ct is scandalous, it is sufficient if the Trademark Examining Attorney shows that the term is vulgar. *Id.* at 1248; *Luxuria*, 100 USPQ2d at 1148. Our primary reviewing Court has consistently held that “the threshold for objectionable matter is lower for what can be described as ‘scandalous’ than for ‘obscene.’” *In re McGinley*, 660 F.2d 481, 211 USPQ 668, 673 n.9 (CCPA 1981).

In determining whether a particular designation is scandalous, we must consider the term in the context of the marketplace as applied to applicant’s identified goods. *In re Fox*, 105 USPQ2d at 1248. Furthermore, the analysis must be made (1) from the standpoint of a substantial composite of the general public, and (2) in terms of contemporary attitudes. *Id.* Thus, even though “the news and entertainment media today [may be] vividly portraying degrees of violence and sexual activity that, while popular today, would have left the average audience of a generation ago aghast” [*In re Mavety Media Group Ltd.*, 33 F.3d 1367, 31 USPQ2d 1923, 1926 (Fed. Cir. 1994)], there are still terms that are sufficiently vulgar that they fall under the prohibition of Section 2(a). *See In re Tinseltown, Inc.*, 212 USPQ

863, 866 (TTAB 1981) (“the fact that profane words may be uttered more freely does not render them any the less profane”; refusing to register **BULLSHIT** for personal accessories and clothing). *See also In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc.*, 107 USPQ2d 2059 (TTAB 2013) (**AWSHIT WORKS** refused as vulgar); *In re Red Bull GmbH*, 78 USPQ2d 1375 (TTAB 2006) (**BULLSHIT** refused as vulgar). While each of these decisions was decided on its own merits and record relevant to the time of decision, they illustrate the enduring vulgarity of some terms, despite changing times or norms.

#### IV. The evidence

##### A. *Dictionary Evidence*

From the dictionary entries placed into the record by the Trademark Examining Attorney, we have no doubt but that the word “fuck” continues correctly to be characterized as “offensive,”<sup>3</sup> “extremely offensive,” “highly offensive,” “intentionally offensive,” an “obscenity,” “vulgar slang,” the “f-bomb,” and at the root of a number of other twisted and angry expressions.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> **Fuck:** *Fuck* is one of the most common words in English—it’s also *one of the most offensive*. Its main meaning is “have sex,” but it has hundreds of other uses.

This slang term for sexual intercourse is not a word to be used lightly—it’s an obscenity that, if used on some television networks, could cost the person who “dropped the f-bomb” thousands of dollars. Despite all the people who don’t want to hear it, *fuck* is one of the most common obscenities, and can be used as a noun, verb, adjective, and adverb. It’s often used as a modifier to add emphasis to another word, as in “that’s so  *fucking*  stupid!” [vocabulary.com](http://vocabulary.com), as attached to Final Office action of January 27, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> For example, from the Wikipedia entry, under the heading “*Offensiveness*”: “. . . It is unclear whether the word has al-

**fuck** – definition

VERB [INTRANSITIVE/TRANSITIVE] OFFENSIVE



/fʌk/

Word Forms

e.g., past tense **fucked**  
past participle **fucked**MACMILLAN  
DICTIONARYView thesaurus entry for **fuck**[What are red words?](#) [Using the thesaurus](#)

an extremely offensive expression that means to have sex with someone

**Thesaurus** entry for this meaning of fuck

**PHRASE**

- **fuck it/you/them etc.** offensive  
an extremely offensive expression used for showing anger at someone or something

**Thesaurus** entry for this meaning of fuck

**PHRASAL VERBS**

- [fuck around](#)
- [fuck off](#)
- [fuck over](#)
- [fuck up](#)
- [fuck with](#)

**Related dictionary definitions****fuck** INTERJECTION**fuck** NOUN**fuck up** PHRASAL VERB**fuck-up** NOUN**fuck off** PHRASAL VERB**fuck over** PHRASAL VERB**fuck with** PHRASAL VERB**fuck around** PHRASAL VERB**the fuck****not give a (flying) fuck**

5

- o O o -

**fucked** – definition

ADJECTIVE OFFENSIVE



/fʌkt/

MACMILLAN  
DICTIONARYView thesaurus entry for **fuck**[What are red words?](#) [Using the thesaurus](#)

1. an extremely offensive word that means having no chance of success

**Thesaurus** entry for this meaning of fucked

2. an extremely offensive word that means completely broken or destroyed

**Thesaurus** entry for this meaning of fucked

**Related dictionary definitions**

...

6

- o O o -

ways been considered *vulgar*, and if not, when it first came to be used to describe (often in an extremely angry, hostile or belligerent manner) unpleasant circumstances or people in an intentionally offensive way, such as in the term *motherfucker*, one of its more common usages in some parts of the English-speaking world . . . .”

[wikipedia.org](http://wikipedia.org), as attached to Final Office action of January 27, 2013.

The terms “fuck” and “motherfucker” are two on the list of “George Carlin’s Seven Dirty Words.” 10 TTABVue at 7 of 7.

<sup>5</sup> [macmillandictionary.com](http://macmillandictionary.com), (American English definition), Macmillan Publishers Limited, as attached to Office action denying Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration, dated Aug. 20, 2013, 9 TTABVue at 3 of 8.

<sup>6</sup> The Trademark Examining Attorney asked that we take judicial notice of this entry, including its pronunciation, as shown at

**Fuck** (fʊk) *Vulgar Slang**v.* **fucked, fuck·ing, fucks***v.tr.*

1. To have sexual intercourse with.
2. To take advantage of, betray, or cheat; victimize.
3. Used in the imperative as a signal of angry dismissal.

*v.intr.*

1. To engage in sexual intercourse.
2. To act wastefully or foolishly.
3. To interfere; meddle. Often used with *with*.<sup>7</sup>

The term “fuct” is recognized as a slang and literal equivalent of the word “fucked,” and having the same vulgar meaning. The Trademark Examining Attorney provided a copy of an entry for the term “fuct” from the Urban Dictionary that equates the two:<sup>8</sup>

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[macmillandictionary.com](http://macmillandictionary.com). Macmillan Publishers Limited. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions that appear in printed publications, including online dictionaries with regular fixed editions. *In re Red Bull GmbH*, 78 USPQ2d at 1378; *University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., Inc.*, 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983). We note that in applying the Macmillan phonetic guides for “American English” to the vowel sound of the “ʌ” creating the strong form of the stressed syllable in the word “fucked” [fʌkt/], one would have an adjectival form pronounced phonetically as “fukt.” Because the letters “c” and “k” can be pronounced identically, the pronunciations would then be identical.

<sup>7</sup> The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, available at [thefreedictionary.com](http://thefreedictionary.com).

<sup>8</sup> As attached to initial refusal under Section 2(a) in Office action of July 3, 2012.

**Fuct**

- The past tense of the verb fuck. Also used to express a general state of incapability.

*We are so fuct!*

*She fuct me like a dog in heat!*

*That's fuct up!*

(Rural definition) *Hey maw, I just fuct yer best frind [sic].*

. . .

- fuct—friends u can trust  
fuct for life bro  
without a doubt brother

**B. Applicant's declaration**

According to Mr. Brunetti's declaration drafted during this proceeding:

¶4. The name of the FUCT brand is an arbitrary made up word. However, to the extent I am asked for a meaning I refer to FRIENDS U CAN'T TRUST. See Exhibit "4."<sup>9</sup>

¶5. The FUCT brand does not refer to "fuck" or the act of sexual intercourse.

¶6. In the 22 years since its creation, the FUCT brand has been sold throughout the United States and worldwide. The brand has been sold in a vari-

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<sup>9</sup> A wiki contribution to THE URBAN DICTIONARY lists "friends u can trust" as an expression supporting one alleged origin of the term "FUCT." However, consistent with Applicant's overall philosophy, he seems to have adopted FRRIENDS U CAN'T TRUST—the opposite meaning—as a justification for his having selected his **fuct** term.

ety of retailers, from small skate and street fashion shops up to the worldwide retailer Urban Outfitters . . . .

¶17. FUCT’s products do not show anything that refers to sexual intercourse. Nor does its blog. Exhibit “3.” In fact, there is very little in FUCT’s products that could even be considered in bad taste.

In this context, Applicant’s response of January 2, 2013, argues as follows:

. . . Although the brand is cutting edge, there is nothing on the labeling to imply any connection with sexual intercourse. When the clothing products themselves are examined, they do not have any graphics that would suggest that FUCT means “fuck”: there are no graphics of nude or even semi-nude persons.

***C. Evidence of Applicant’s FUCT line of clothing and accessories***

Both the Trademark Examining Attorney and Applicant have made of record hundreds of visuals—many of them taken from applicant’s website and online blog titled “The Love Awareness Program”—showing Applicant’s use of the term **fuct** on T-shirts, other goods and related blog postings.<sup>10</sup> These pictures show that Applicant’s website and products contain strong, and often explicit, sexual imagery that objectifies women and

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<sup>10</sup> [blog.fuct.com](http://blog.fuct.com). As noted, the blog is titled “The Love Awareness Program.” However, apart from suggesting objects of sexual desire, any of the more common connotations of “Love” (such as “affection,” “devotion,” “tenderness” or “warmth”) are not readily apparent from a perusal of Applicant’s blog entries over a period of years.

offers degrading examples of extreme misogyny, generally immediately next to Applicant's use of his proposed mark. It is clear from the record that the term "Fuct," as used by applicant, will be perceived by his targeted market segment as the phonetic equivalent of the work "fucked," and leaves an unmistakable aura of negative sexual connotations.

Further, moving to the secondary definitions of "fucked" and "fuct" that connote lives "having no chance of success," the dictionaries make it clear, in this context, that the term "fucked" (or "fuct") is still "an extremely offensive word." See [macmillandictionary.com](http://macmillandictionary.com). We conclude from a review of the entire record that Applicant's clothing and website also mirror the offensive nature of the word in this context as well. In response to the pessimistic, rhetorical question of "just how 'fuct' are we?," the imagery Applicant employs throughout this record is one of extreme nihilism—displaying an unending succession of anti-social imagery of executions, despair, violent and bloody scenes including dismemberment, hellacious or apocalyptic events, and dozens of examples of other imagery lacking in taste, usually in close proximity to Applicant's use of his proposed mark.

#### V. Analysis

In light of the evidence recited above, with the prevalence of various meanings of the term "fucked" (e.g., having decidedly-negative sexual connotations, as well as extreme misogyny, depravity, violence, intolerance, anger, and imagery of being "doomed" or a "loser," etc.) that dominate applicant's themes and designs, we find that applicant's declaration statements that "fuct" was chosen as an invented or coined term stretches

credulity. Although counsel explicitly argues that Applicant’s repeated reliance upon the acronym explanation allegedly drawn from the phrase FRIENDS U CAN’T TRUST is “*not just a façade* [for Applicant] to hide [behind]” (*emphasis supplied*), we conclude, to the contrary, that the term “fuct” was chosen precisely because it was knowingly calibrated to be simultaneously alluring, offensive, and corporate (i.e., “mainstream”)—retaining just enough ambiguity to provide plausible deniability when necessary around the question of whether it is merely another way to say “fucked,” while knowing that members of its specially target audience would never be fooled.

As to Applicant’s claim that “vulgar” is not the correct standard under Section 2(a), we find that while various precedential cases of our primary reviewing court define the meaning of “scandalous” in additional and more comprehensive terms, the word “vulgar” captures the essence of the prohibition against registration in the case at bar, and therefore, we have chosen to use the term “vulgar” to facilitate our analysis and discussion, and to encapsulate what the Trademark Examining Attorney called “vulgar, profane and scandalous slang.”

We have seen from the dictionary definitions of record that “fucked” and its phonetic twin, “fuct,” are both vulgar terms. Whether one considers “fucked” as a sexual term, or finds that Applicant has used “fucked/fuct” in the context of extreme misogyny, nihilism or violence, we have no question but that these are still extremely offensive terms in the year 2014. That there has been a U.S. band performing and recording under the name “Fucked Up” is irrelevant to our determination. Similarly, that the United States Patent and



Trademark Office may have issued trademark registrations where the composite mark contained the word “Screwed” is also of no moment in our determination of whether the terms “fucked/fuct” are scandalous.

As to the fact that **fuct** has served as applicant’s source identifier for decades, we reiterate that our responsibility under the Lanham Act is to determine the question of registrability based upon our applying contemporary standards to the specific evidence of record. We find that the Trademark Examining Attorney has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial composite<sup>11</sup> of the general public would find this designation vulgar.<sup>12</sup> Applicant’s cult following may well represent a reliable niche market for its goods and ideology. While the existence of this market segment may reveal differing opinions within the consumer community, once a substantial composite has been found to consider the term scandalous, the mere existence of differing opinions cannot change the conclusion. *Cf. Amanda Blackhorse, et al. v. Pro-Football, Inc.*, 111 USPQ2d 1080, 1111 (TTAB 2014) (in the recent “Redskins case,” the issue was disparagement, not scandalousness, but the principle as to the effect of our finding a “substantial composite” is the same). Moreover, that any given Trademark Examining Attorney may have initially failed to make a scandalous refusal under

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<sup>11</sup> A substantial composite is “not necessarily a majority.” *See In re Mavety Media Group Ltd.*, 31 USPQ2d at 1925 (quoting *In re McGinley*, 211 USPQ at 673).

<sup>12</sup> *See In re Manwin/RK Collateral Trust*, 111 USPQ2d 1311, 1315 (TTAB 2014) (the Board should consider the views of the general public and not just consumers of the particular goods/services—in *Manwin*, online porn).

Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act is also immaterial to our decision herein.

Finally, we readily recognize the statutory limitations of this tribunal. It is abundantly clear that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is not the appropriate forum for re-evaluating the impacts of any evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within Article III courts upon determinations under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, or for answering the Constitutional arguments of legal commentators or blog critics.

***Decision:*** The refusal to register Applicant's applied-for term, **fuct**, under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is hereby affirmed.

**APPENDIX C**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

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No. 2015-1109

IN RE: ERIK BRUNETTI, APPELLANT

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Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark  
Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in  
No. 85310960.

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Filed: Apr. 12, 2018

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**ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC**

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Before: PROST, *Chief Judge*, NEWMAN, LOURIE, DYK,  
MOORE, O'MALLEY, REYNA, WALLACH, TARANTO, CHEN,  
HUGHES, and STOLL, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM.

**ORDER**

Appellee Andrei Iancu filed a petition for rehearing en banc. A response to the petition was invited by the court and filed by appellant Erik Brunetti. The petition was first referred as a petition for rehearing to the panel that heard the appeal, and thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc was referred to the circuit judges who are in regular active service.

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Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The petition for panel rehearing is denied.

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied.

The mandate of the court will issue on Apr. 19, 2018.

FOR THE COURT

Apr. 12, 2018  
Date

/s/ PETER R. MARKSTEINER  
PETER R. MARKSTEINER  
Clerk of Court

**APPENDIX D**

1. 15 U.S.C. 1052 provides:

**Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration**

No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—

(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in connection with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement (as defined in section 3501(9) of title 19) enters into force with respect to the United States.

(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.

(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow.

(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: *Provided*, That if the Director determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in connection with which such marks are used, concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to (1) the earliest of the filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this chapter; (2) July 5, 1947, in the case of registrations previously issued under the Act of March 3, 1881, or February 20, 1905, and continuing in full force and effect on that date; or (3) July 5, 1947, in the case of applications filed under the Act of February 20, 1905, and registered after July 5, 1947. Use prior to the filing date of any pending application or a registration shall not be required when the owner of such application or registration consents to the grant of a concurrent registration to the applicant. Concurrent registrations may also be issued by the Director when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In issuing concurrent registrations, the Director shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the

mark or the goods on or in connection with which such mark is registered to the respective persons.

(e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be registrable under section 1054 of this title, (3) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, (4) is primarily merely a surname, or (5) comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional.

(f) Except as expressly excluded in subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(3), and (e)(5) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. The Director may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant's goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made. Nothing in this section shall prevent the registration of a mark which, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, and which became distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce before December 8, 1993.

A mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title, may be refused registration only pursuant to

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a proceeding brought under section 1063 of this title. A registration for a mark which would be likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under section 1125(c) of this title, may be canceled pursuant to a proceeding brought under either section 1064 of this title or section 1092 of this title.