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## Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?

Under 35 U.S.C. § 6, administrative patent judges of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) are appointed by the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). That method of appointment is almost certainly unconstitutional, and the administrative patent judges serving under such appointments are likely to be viewed by the courts as having no constitutionally valid governmental authority.

The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. II, § 2, cl. 2) provides:

[The President] by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as a rather strict limitation on the constitutionally permissible methods of appointment. Under the Court's precedent, any government appointee "exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States' and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [the Appointments Clause]." *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). The Clause is properly interpreted as "limit[ing] the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint" and thereby "preventing the diffusion of the appointment power." *Freytag v. Commissioner*, 501 U.S. 868, 880, 878 (1991). Thus, if a person in the government exercises "significant authority," the person is at least an "inferior Officer[]" and can be appointed only through one of the four methods listed in the Appointments Clause: (1) by the President acting with the advice and consent of the Senate; (2) by the President alone; (3) by the "Courts of Law"; or (4) by the "Heads of Departments." So-called "principal" officers — those neither "subordinate" nor "'inferior' in rank and authority" to another constitutional officer — may only be appointed through the first means. See *Morrison v. Olson*, 487 U.S. 654, 671-73 (1988).

In the case of administrative patent judges, this constitutional doctrine generates two questions. First, do administrative patent judges exercise "significant authority" under

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the laws of the United States? Second, is the Director of the PTO a “Head of Department” for purposes of the Appointments Clause? If the answer to the first question is “yes,” then the judges are at least “inferior Officers” subject to the restrictions of the Appointments Clause. The second question then tests whether appointment of the judges by the PTO Director is constitutional. (Since the PTO Director is clearly not the President or Court of Law, he cannot appoint officers unless he qualifies as a Head of Department.) Neither of these questions is difficult to answer under current constitutional precedents.

On the first issue, it seems pretty plain that administrative patent judges exercise significant authority within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court explained in *Freytag v. Commissioner*, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991), the relevant distinction is between “inferior Officers” — who perform significant functions pursuant to law and who are subject to the Appointments Clause — and mere “employees,” who are “lesser functionaries” lacking substantial powers. The appointees at issue in *Freytag* were special trial judges of the Tax Court, and the government argued that those judges were not officers because such a judge “acts only as an aide to the Tax Court judge responsible for deciding the case,” “does no more than assist the Tax Court judge in taking the evidence and preparing the proposed findings and opinion,” and in almost all cases “lack[s] authority to enter a final decision.” *Id.* at 880-81. Yet despite these limitations on the authority of the special trial judges, the Court held them to be officers because their offices are “established by Law” and they “perform more than ministerial tasks,” including “tak[ing] testimony, conduct[ing] trials, rul[ing] on the admissibility of evidence, and . . . enforc[ing] compliance with discovery orders.” *Id.* at 881-82. These were “important functions” in which the judges exercised “significant discretion,” and thus the judges could not be considered mere functionaries.

Furthermore, the *Freytag* Court noted that the special trial judges could be assigned by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to render final decisions of the court “in declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases.” *Id.* at 882. Even the government conceded that in those cases (which were not before the Court in *Freytag*), “special trial judges act as inferior officers who exercise independent authority.” *Id.* Yet the Court held that the judges could not be “inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties . . . but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities.” *Id.* Thus, even though the special trial judge had not been responsible for rendering the final decision in the case before it, the Court still held that the authority to render such decisions in other cases provided another basis for concluding that the special trial judges must be considered officers.

Administrative patent judges have much more authority than the judges at issue in *Freytag*. Like the special trial judges, administrative patent judges are officers “established by Law,” and they have more than ministerial duties under the statute, 35 U.S.C. § 6. Indeed, they are not mere adjuncts or advisors to another set of adjudicators, as in *Freytag*. Rather they are full members of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). Their powers include the ability to run trials, take evidence, rule on admissibility and compel compliance with discovery orders. See 37 CFR §§ 41.125 (Board’s power to rule on motions), 41.150 - 41.151 (Board’s powers to issue sanctions and order discovery); 41.152 (making applicable the Federal Rules of Evidence, with the powers of district courts being lodged in the Board).

A panel of three administrative patent judges may sit as the BPAI, see 35 U.S.C. § 6(b), and is authorized by law to render final decisions for the PTO. Indeed, in interference cases, the statute expressly states that any BPAI decision adverse to an applicant shall constitute the “final refusal” by the Patent and Trademark Office as to the claims involved. 35 U.S.C. § 135. The finality of the Board’s decisions in *ex parte* appeals is implicit in the statutory scheme, which provides a right of appeal from any decision of the Board to the Article III courts. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145; see also PBAI Standard Operating Procedure 2 — Publication of Opinions and Binding Precedent (available at <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/sop2.pdf>) (noting that the Director of the PTO may review BPAI decisions to determine whether they should be made precedential but that such review “is not for the purpose of reviewing or affecting the outcome of any given appeal”). Furthermore, during judicial review of the Board’s decisions, Article III courts are required to afford the decisions of the Board a substantial degree of deference under the Administrative Procedure Act. See *Dickinson v. Zurko*, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). The power to reach a final administrative decision — one that the courts are required to respect with deference — surely means that the members of the BPAI are exercising significant authority under the law and are thus officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause.

It is true that the Director of the PTO retains a substantial supervisory role over the BPAI and can, for example, use his power to designate BPAI panels that “he hopes will render the decision he desires, even upon rehearing.” *In re Alappat*, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994).<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the Board judges retain substantial authority. They are not mere “alter ego[s] or agent[s]” of the PTO Director because the Director’s powers afford only “limited control ... over the Board and the decisions it issues.” *Id.* at 1535-36. Moreover, the Board’s adjudicatory power “does not rest on the [PTO Director’s] own authority.” *Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg*, 932 F.2d 920, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1991). It is instead an “independent grant” of statutory adjudicatory power. *Id.* at 929.

The Federal Circuit’s decision in *Alappat* also states that, even after the Board has rendered a decision, the PTO Director has a further power to refuse to issue a patent, at least in circumstances where “he believes that [issuing the patent] would be contrary to law.” 33 F.3d at 1535. *Alappat* does not suggest, however, that the Director must or indeed even could re-adjudicate *de novo* all issues decided in every Board proceeding. Such re-adjudication would seem to have no statutory basis and would seem to be in tension with the Supreme Court’s statement in *Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 523 n.6 (1966), that the “Commissioner [now renamed PTO Director] may be appropriately considered bound by Board determinations.” Re-adjudication

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<sup>1</sup> The PTO Director’s powers to select BPAI panels and to designate certain BPAI opinions as precedential help to explain why administrative patent judges may be considered “inferior” and not principal officers, for the judges are inferior and subordinate in significant ways to the PTO Director. See *Morrison v. Olson*, 487 U.S. 654, 671-73 (1988). These limitations on the judges’ authority do not detract from their power to render decisions in individual cases concerning important and valuable patent rights. That decisional power is the key to deciding that the judges are more than mere functionaries.

by the PTO Director would also, at least with respect to individual factual issues, raise difficult issues of due process. The decisional function in an administrative adjudication “cannot be performed by one who has not considered evidence or argument. ... The one who decides must hear.” *Morgan v. United States*, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936). Thus, if the Director were to re-adjudicate the basis for BPAI decisions as part of a decision whether to issue or to deny a patent, he would at a minimum have to consider the record developed in the administrative proceedings before the BPAI. There is no evidence that the Director is undertaking such an independent, de novo review and thus, as a legal and practical matter, substantial decisional power seems to be lodged precisely where statutory law suggests it lies — with the members of BPAI.<sup>2</sup>

Lower court case law also supports the view that administrative patent judges are officers for constitutional purposes. In *Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. United States HHS*, 80 F.3d 796 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit held that members of the Appeals Board of the Department of Health and Human Services were “clearly” officers, not mere employees, because they had the broad discretion and authority to conduct hearings and to rule on matters (such as claims to federal funds from various health and welfare programs) assigned to the Appeals Board by statute or by administrative delegation. Similarly, in other cases where administrative adjudicators render either final agency decisions or decisions that are entitled to deference at the next stage of administrative review, the government has consistently conceded that the adjudicators are officers subject to the Appointments Clause. See, e.g., *Ryder v. United States*, 515 U.S. 177, 180, 186-88 (1995) (noting the lower court’s conclusion that judges on the Coast Guard Court of Military Review were officers and holding that the inclusion of such invalidly appointed judges in a panel could not be considered harmless error); *Willy v. Admin. Review Bd.*, 423 F.3d 483, 491 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005) (noting the government’s concession that members of the Administrative Review Board, which adjudicates whistleblower claims inside the Department of Labor, are officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause).

In the lone lower court case holding administrative adjudicators to be mere employees, the court stressed that the relevant adjudicators were incapable of rendering final decisions for the agency and instead generated only recommended decisions that were subject to de novo review within the agency. See *Landry v. FDIC*, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Landry court believed that Freytag had rested “exceptional stress on the [special trial judges’] final decisionmaking power,” and that without such a power, “purely recommendatory powers” could not qualify administrative adjudicators as officers. *Id.* at 1134. The reasoning of Landry also strongly suggests that administrative adjudicators with final decisionmaking powers like administrative patent judges do exercise significant authority and therefore qualify as officers under the Appointments Clause.

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<sup>2</sup> Under Freytag the Court considered special trial judges to be officers because, *inter alia*, the Chief Judge of the Tax Court could assign special trial judges the power to render final decisions on behalf of the Tax Court. 501 U.S. at 882. Thus, if the PTO Director has statutory power to permit panels of administrative patent judges to render final decisions in particular cases, the judges would still be officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause.

The conclusion that administrative patent judges are inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause is supported also by a recent opinion by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). In April of this year, OLC issued an opinion stressing that the concept of "Officers of the United States" in the Appointments Clause has generally been interpreted to include "many particular officers who had authority but little if any discretion in administering the laws; these included officers such as registers of the land offices, masters and mates of revenue cutters, inspectors of customs, deputy collectors of customs, deputy postmasters, and district court clerks." See *Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause*, 2007 OLC Lexis 3, at \*59-59 (April, 16, 2007). The OLC opinion also concluded that the Appointments Clause applies where the relevant officers have "authority to act in the first instance, whether or not that act may be subject to direction or review by superior officers." *Id.* at \*60. As an example, the OLC opinion notes that inferior revenue officers were long considered to be subject to the Appointments Clause because they had authority to make tax classification decisions, even though "those decisions could be subjected to two layers of appeal, the second being the Treasury Secretary himself." *Id.* (noting also that the officer's decision "could" decide the rights of other "even though by law [it was] readily 'subject to revision and correction' on the initiative of the taxpayer").

This brings us to the question whether administrative patent judges are being validly appointed within the limitations of the Appointments Clause. Because the PTO Director is not the President or a court of law, the validity of the appointment process turns on whether the Director can be viewed as a "Head of Department." Once again, *Freytag* is the leading case on the subject, and it pretty clearly forecloses any argument that the Director could be considered a department head. Under the majority reasoning in *Freytag*, "Heads of Departments" for purposes of the Appointments Clause are confined "to executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments," which the Court held to be "limited in number and easily identified." 501 U.S. at 886. The PTO Director is subordinate to the Secretary of Commerce and therefore cannot qualify as a Cabinet-level department head. The official title of the PTO Director is "Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office." 35 U.S.C. § 3(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, the PTO itself is statutorily "established as an agency of the United States, within the Department of Commerce" and is "subject to the policy direction of the Secretary of Commerce." 35 U.S.C. § 1(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1511(4) (listing the PTO as one of the bureaus "under the jurisdiction and subject to the control of the Secretary of Commerce"). Thus, the PTO Director's primary duty — to "provid[e] policy direction and management supervision for the [PTO]," 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) — is subject to the oversight of the Secretary of Commerce. Indeed, even under the more capacious view of "Heads of Departments" articulated in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in *Freytag* an Under Secretary fails to qualify because heads of departments encompass only "the heads of all agencies immediately below the President in the organizational structure of the Executive Branch." *Id.* at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring the judgment); see also *id.* at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that "a subdivision of the Department of the Treasury . . . would not qualify" as a Department). Thus, an Under Secretary of Commerce is not a constitutionally acceptable appointing authority for officers of the United States like administrative patent judges.

If, as seems clear, the current appointment process for administrative patent judges is unconstitutional, the next obvious question is whether the unconstitutional appointment process will lead to the invalidation of a significant number of BPAI decisions. In other words, the question is whether, as a practical matter, the problem is a serious one for the agency. The short answer is that it is serious, though precisely how serious is hard to determine. There are three relevant considerations here. One consideration, which tends to exacerbate the problem, is that the courts have articulated very broad standing rules for challenging constitutionally invalid appointments to adjudicatory bodies. Under this case law, a party challenging the composition of an administrative agency must prove only that the agency has rendered an adverse decision against the party (thus establishing “injury” for purposes of standing law) and that the party has “been ‘directly subject to the authority of the agency.’” *Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund*, 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thus, any party that loses an appeal or an interference before the BPAI has standing to challenge the legality of the Board’s composition even if the party cannot demonstrate “that he has received less favorable treatment than he would have if the agency were lawfully constituted and otherwise authorized to discharge its functions.” *Id.* (quoting *Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.*, 766 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). *NRA Political Victory* shows just how far the courts have extended this logic. In that case, the party was challenging of constitutionality of including certain non-voting “ex officio” members within the Federal Election Commission (FEC). In its decision holding the FEC’s appointment structure unconstitutional (and therefore vacating the agency decision in the case), the D.C. Circuit reasoned that even non-voting members of an adjudicatory body may exert “some influence” during deliberations by “their mere presence.” 6 F.3d at 826. The Supreme Court has also indicated that objections to the appointment of an adjudicator may be raised for the first time on appeal, so the Appointments Clause objection may be raised in cases now pending in the courts where parties are seeking judicial review of BPAI decisions. See *Freytag* 501 U.S. at 878-79; *Nguyen v. United States*, 539 U.S. 69, 77-81 (2003).

Two other considerations tend to restrict the scope of the problem created by the unconstitutional appointment of administrative patent judges. First, the appointment process set forth in current law is only seven years old, and many of the judges on the BPAI were appointed under prior statutory law, which had given the appointment power to the Secretary of Commerce. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(a) (1999) (conferring power on the Secretary of Commerce to appoint all officers and employees of the PTO). The legislation establishing the new appointment process was enacted on November 29, 1999, and took effect on March 29, 2000. See *Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999*, §§ 4717 & 4731, 113 Stat. 1501-A522, 1501-A581 – 1501-A582 (1999). Administrative patent judges appointed to the BPAI before that last date should have a constitutionally valid appointment from a Secretary of Commerce. The BPAI does not post on its website any convenient list of its judges and their dates of appointments, but it appears that a substantial number of the judges currently serving on the BPAI have been there longer than seven years (though many have not).

The second mitigating factor is that the BPAI generally operates in panels without deliberative participation by non-panel members. Although the standing requirements for challenging invalidly constituted adjudicatory bodies generally allow “radically

attenuated” connections between the claimed injury and the invalid appointment, Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131, it seems unlikely that courts would permit a party to raise an Appointments Clause challenge where none of the body’s invalidly appointed members participated in the decisionmaking process. Though the matter is not free from doubt, the BPAI’s internal operating procedures appear to foreclose the participation of nonpanel judges in the decisionmaking process of a particular panel (for the Board’s procedures, see <http://uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/stdproced.html>). One BPAI judge — the Chief Judge of the Board — does exercise some authority with respect to all the cases that come before the BPAI because the Chief Judge Board maintains an assignment power over all panels (see <http://uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/sop1.pdf>). However, the current Chief Judge was appointed to the Board in 1994 (see <http://uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/gcounsel/bios.htm#fleming>) and therefore almost certainly has a constitutionally valid appointment.

In sum, a party appearing before a panel composed solely of pre-2000 judges would not have standing to raise the constitutional objection to the post-2000 judges. A constitutional challenge is, however, almost certainly available to parties litigating before BPAI panels having at least one administrative patent judge who was appointed on or after March 29, 2000. See *Nguyen*, 539 U.S. at 82 (holding that the presence of only a single invalidly appointed judge is sufficient to vacate the judgment of a panel containing a quorum of validly appointed judges). Because the BPAI does not post a list of its judges and their appointment dates on its website, it is not easy to determine what fraction of BPAI panels include at least one such member. However, a quick look at a few recent high-profile BPAI cases suggests many panels are invalidly constituted. The problem seems to be quite serious.<sup>3</sup>

The solutions to this constitutional problem are really quite few. The Secretary of Commerce cannot simply appoint the existing cadre of administrative patent judges because appointment by a “Head of Department” can occur only where Congress has conferred the appointment power by law. Yet the Secretary’s power to appoint PTO officers generally, and BPAI members in particular, was specifically removed by Congress in 1999. Cf. *Edmond v. United States*, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (permitting the Secretary of Transportation to ratify the appointment of officers who previously lacked a valid appointment where the Secretary possessed a general power to appoint all officers in the Department and no statute conferred the power to appoint the relevant officials in any other person).<sup>4</sup> In the short term, the BPAI’s business can be

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<sup>3</sup> There are a number of other possible complex arguments that might raised by the government to try to sustain the constitutionality of the appointment system or to minimize the practical effect of the unconstitutional appointments. I have considered these arguments and believe that each would fail. For sake of brevity and clarity, I have not detailed all of those complexities and subtleties here. Readers interested in such details are welcome to contact me ([jfduffy@law.gwu.edu](mailto:jfduffy@law.gwu.edu)); other comments and suggestions are, of course, welcome.

<sup>4</sup> There is a line of precedents establishing that an appointment will be considered to be made by a “Head of Department” if, by law, the appointment was subject to approval or approbation by the Head of the relevant Department (e.g., by the

handled by judges appointed prior to 2000. In the longer term, the only real solution is for Congress to remedy the situation, either by giving the appointment power back to the Secretary (which seems most likely) or by making the PTO its own department (which seems less likely). Fortunately, the Congress has patent legislation pending. This legislation currently drafted would confer even more power to the BPAI by authorizing the Board to adjudicate post-grant oppositions. As part of that reform, Congress must fix the constitutional problem with the BPAI's appointment process.

Finally, it is worth asking how this constitutional problem arose. There are two answers here. First, there is the hasty and unusual method by which the 1999 statute was enacted. The statute responsible for changing the appointments process of BPAI members, the "Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999," was enacted as one of nine bills that were "incorporated by reference" into the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2000. In other words, the text of the legislation voted on by Congress includes the only following language:

Sec. 1000.(a) The provisions of the following bills are hereby enacted into law:

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Secretary of Commerce). But in *United States v. Mouat*, 124 U.S. 303 (1888), the Supreme Court held that this theory could not be extended to justify the appointment of an officer where no statute required the concurrence of the department head:

If there were any statute which authorized the head of the Navy Department to appoint a paymaster's clerk, the technical argument, that the appointment in this case, although actually made by Paymaster Whitehouse and only approved by Harmony as Acting Secretary in a formal way . . . might still be considered sufficient to call this an appointment by the head of that Department. But there is no statute authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to appoint a paymaster's clerk, nor is there any act requiring his approval of such an appointment, and the regulations of the navy do not seem to require any such appointment or approval for the holding of that position.

*Id.* at 307-08. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Department of Commerce has recognized the constitutional problem with the statutory appointment structure and found some avenue by which, despite the apparent terms of 35 U.S.C. § 6, the Secretary of Commerce and not the PTO Director can bear responsibility for appointing administrative patent judges. Despite an extensive search, however, I have uncovered no evidence that this has occurred or indeed could occur under existing statutory law. The PTO's publicly available materials give no hint that anyone other than the PTO Director is appointing administrative patent judges. See, e.g., PTO Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1202 (8<sup>th</sup> ed. Aug. 2006 rev.) (reproducing 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) in the Manual's section on "Composition of the Board" without any suggestion that administrative patent judges are appointed by someone other than the PTO Director). If the agency believes that it has found some way to push responsibility back to the Secretary without a statutory fix, it should be candid about the true location of the appointing power and the legal basis for shifting it.



## Duffy, Administrative Patent Judges and the Constitution

(9) S. 1948 of the 106th Congress, as introduced on November 17, 1999.

Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1535-36 (1999). The Appropriations Act then instructs the Archivist of the United States to find the nine bills referenced by the legislation and to publish those bills as “appendixes” to the U.S. Statutes at Large. *Id.* § 1000(b), 113 Stat. at 1536. (The Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act, which was S. 1948, appears on page 1501-A522 of the volume 113 of the Statutes at Large.)

Such an incorporation-by-reference method of enacting law may very well be constitutional, but to put it mildly, the technique certainly does not foster full consideration of the legislation by the members of Congress and the President. The normal legislative process typically includes multiple reviews of legislative language by different components of the government, including various divisions in the Department of Justice, such as the Office of Legal Counsel, that seek to identify constitutional problems in pending bills. It is thus quite possible, though difficult to know with certainty, that the incorporation-by-reference method of enacting the 1999 legislation helped the constitutionally infirm appointment structure to slip through the legislative process unnoticed.

A second difficulty with the 1999 statute goes directly to Congress’s intent in restructuring the PTO. The overarching intent of the statute is to confer on the PTO head more authority and status, and yet keep the Office firmly within the Department of Commerce. That schizophrenic intent goes to the very heart of the constitutional problem. The Appointments Clause is designed to prevent the diffusion of appointment power precisely so that the individual with primary responsibility for a governmental department is both at a high level (subordinate only to the President) and readily identifiable. This wise requirement makes the lines of responsibility more visible. If something is amiss in a department of government, responsibility — and blame — cannot be deflected to a lower level of government than the department head because he, or President himself, is directly responsible not only for managing the department but also for appointing officials who exercise any significant authority within it. Yet the precise effect of 1999 statute is to push responsibility to someone below the department head and generally to muddle the lines of authority. Who is to blame if the BPAI is producing unwise decisions? The Secretary of Commerce can disclaim responsibility because, after all, he does not have power to select individuals to serve on the Board.

The ultimate reason this constitutional problem arose is therefore an innate conflict between a traditional reluctance to change lines of governmental authority and a growing recognition by Congress of the increased importance of intellectual property to the national economy. The latter point counsels toward increasing the power, prestige and status of the PTO head, but tradition pushes against creating a separate governmental department, like the Environmental Protection Agency, that is subordinate only to the President. And so Congress took half a step in 1999, but it is precisely such half steps that generate constitutional difficulty.